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The Solidarity Crisis, 1980-81: 
The Near Death of Communism 
Jane Leftwich Curry 
Abstract 
The Solidarity trade union formed in the shipyards of 
Gdansk after a summer of strikes called by factory workers in 
response to price increases on food . At the end of August 
1980, the men who had replaced Edward Gierek's elite signed 
an accord with the striking representatives of what came to be 
called Solidarity to provide increased benefits, and the right to 
have a free and independent trade union, to strike, and to have 
media that reported information more freely. 
It rapidly became a national movement that forced the 
Communist government to make many concessions. In the 
next fifteen months, while the government treated this first 
independent trade union in a communist country as legal, 
other citizens' organizations formed, the media discussed 
political and economic ideas that had long been censored, 
and the government gave in on more and more political issues. 
Then, on December 13, 1981, in response to increasing 
pressure from the rest of the Communist Bloc to stop the 
transformation and a failing economy, the Communist regime 
declared martial law, "a state of war," and interned hundreds 
of Solidarity and intellectual leaders as well as the leaders of 
the former Communist government. 
For the next three years, the government struggled to find 
a balance between repression and co-optation that would 
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allow them to reclaim real power. Once they declared the state 
of war over, they were never in a position to really manage 
popular demands again. 
Building to a Crisis 
T
he workers ' strikes that swept Poland in July and August 1980 and, ulti-
mately, crystallized in the formation of Solidarity signaled the sixth major 
crisis in postwar Polish history. More than that, these events were manifes-
tations of the most profound and pervasive social crisis in Eastern Europe in 
forty years. It was the culmination of changes in the nature of Polish society and 
in its expectations, in the failure of the economy, in the structures and processes 
of governance and control, and in the politics--domestic and foreign, economic 
and political-of the United States, Western Europe, and the states of the Soviet 
Bloc. This was the "bridge crisis"-one in which the lessons and legacies of the 
past were clear, for which there was only a temporary resolution, and from 
which the compromises and ultimate resignation of the Communists stemmed. 
Of the Polish crises, as well, it has been the one most examined and reexamined. 
Individually and collectively, the changes had negative impacts on virtually all 
of Polish society and, at the same time, they isolated groups in the society from 
each other. 
Beyond the depth and breadth of the domestic problems that brought on 
the 1980 crisis and made it virtually unsolvable, the decisions of the 1970s made 
foreign actors more important than they had been at any time since the Yalta 
Agreements were signed at the end of World War II . The timing of the Polish 
events raised the stakes for both West and East. Poland became not only a na-
tion in crisis but also a tool for the internal and international battles of the 
"Great Powers" and Western European states. 
Crisis Background 
There were clear differences between the prelude to the 1980 Solidarity 
crisis and to other, earlier crises. At a leadership level, the Gierek leadership ' s 
policies and personnel were significantly different from his predecessors' . In 
1970, the takeover of Gierek, although he had long been seen as Gomulka' s 
successor, was a takeover by "outsiders." In bringing his supporters from Sile-
sia, Gierek pushed aside the Warsaw circle of Communists that had been gov-
erning Poland since 1945. He made major changes in the system by developing 
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both the size and the prerogatives of the central bureaucracy, significantly re-
ducing the power and authority of regional institutions and leaders, 1 and moving 
the entire claim for legitimacy from ideology and national interest to material 
gains and power. In the end, he based his rule on economic promises he could 
not fulfill. Furthermore, the traditional links between intellectuals and the Polish 
United Workers Party (PUWP) leadership were weakened because many of the 
new top leaders and bureaucrats, particularly in the party, came from outside 
Warsaw and did not have any close personal ties with the main intellectual 
community.2 The links were also weakened by the unwillingness of the Gierek 
leadership to sanction even private criticism of its policies.3 Ultimately, 
Gierek' s isolated elite came to live by rules of visible consumption and internal 
bureaucratic policies, and kept themselves isolated from anyone who might 
disagree.4 
The major alternative institution in Polish society, the Catholic Church, in-
creased its power in the post-1976 period. The Church was strong enough (and 
the pervasiveness of dissent great enough) for it to take the risk of working with 
the more moderate dissident groups like KOR (the Committee in Defense of 
Workers).5 When Karol Wojtyla, the Cracow Bishop, was elected Pope in 1978, 
Poles had a clear focus for inspiration, their own Pope in Rome. His visit in 
1979 triggered an outpouring of support for the papacy and the Church that es-
tablished the Catholic Church as a partner for Communist leaders. The visit also 
proved to Poles that they could organize themselves and that they had numbers 
1 In the summer of 1975, Poland's nineteen regional provinces (wojewodstwa) were 
abolished and replaced by forty-nine small regional units. These regional units were 
coordinated and subordinated to the central government and party apparatus in Warsaw. 
They were deprived of their press organs and also their power over planning and budget-
ing. Effectively, this meant that there were few possibilities for regional leaders to build 
up their own constituencies and to respond to specific local needs. 
2 Prior to the takeover of Edward Gierek, intellectuals in the center had little contact 
with either the intellectual community or the government and party elite in his Silesian 
region. Following his takeover, Gierek brought into the top party elite and governing 
positions in the ministries and media organs men with whom he had worked in Silesia 
and for whom Warsaw was not "home territory." This shift was completed after the 1976 
upheaval. 
3 See the discussion of this in Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Rzeczpospolita na progu lat osi-
emdziesiatych (Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1981 ), pp. 231-59. 
4 After 1989, the literature and revelations on the "sins" of the Gierek elite has become 
so mammoth that there is no single case or piece of literature that can cover all the mate-
rial. The isolation and corruption of the Gierek regime was no secret, however, even in 
the 1970s. Interviews from 1979 and 1983 were filled with information about the re-
gime's corruption and its refusal to deal with critical information. For the other side of 
the story, however, see Edward Gierek's own interview books: Edward Rolicki, Edward 
Gierek: Przerwana dekada (Warsaw: BGW, 1990) and Replika (Warsaw: BGW, 1990). 
5 Adam Michnik, The Church, the Left and Dialogue (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993 ). 
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on their side. This was true even though, initially, the Pope's visit resulted in the 
withdrawal of the Church from visible, active support of KOR. Ultimately, the 
Pope's image-although not necessarily his words--came to symbolize the re-
gime's vulnerability and its lack of support in the population. Walesa waved a 
souvenir pen from the papal visit when he signed the accords that ended the 
strikes in August 1980, and symbols from that visit continued to appear in the 
early days of Solidarity. 
The Polish economy's failures, on the other hand, were only increased af-
ter 1976. From 1976 on, the system could afford to provide less and less to the 
population. Life grew more and more expensive. The store shelves grew barer 
and barer. No one was able even to hope that the economy would succeed in 
achieving any of its promises. At the same time, the Communists' only other 
remaining claim to legitimacy-"better us than the Soviets"-was weakened in 
the 1970s by Poland's increasing reliance and involvement with the West. This 
shift was magnified by the fact that the Brezhnev leadership was aging and so 
weak by the last years of the 1970s that it was difficult to make people see it as 
permanent. 
Political "Events" 
The acute crisis for both the political authorities and the society began in 
July 1980. To get Western banks to reschedule Poland's overwhelming debt, 
estimated at $20 billion in 1980, the Polish authorities agreed to reduce subsi-
dies and increase the costs of basic commodities. To avoid the unrest that had 
derailed price-increase programs in earlier years, the regime limited itself to 
increasing prices on cuts of meat that were virtually unavailable anyway, raising 
them one region at a time. By doing this, they hoped both to establish a prece-
dent for ending subsidies and to placate Western lenders without triggering a 
political confrontation. According to underground publications widely circu-
lated in the summer of 1980, Stanislaw Kania and General Wojciech Jaruzelski, 
then the Politburo members responsible for the security forces and the military, 
told local leaders that demonstrations had to be met with wage concessions, not 
force. 
Initially, the Gdansk shipyard workers negotiated for salary increases when 
prices were raised there at the end of the summer, after they had been raised 
everywhere else.6 When their demands for compensation were granted, it ap-
6 For discussions of the situation and atmosphere of the strikes, see volumes such as 
Neil Ascherson, The Polish August (New York: Penguin Books, 1981); Nicholas An-
drews, Poland 1980-1981 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985); 
Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution (New York: Scribners, 1983); Radio Free 
Europe Research, August, 1980 (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 1980); Kevin Ruane, The 
Polish Challenge (London: British Broadcasting Company, 1982); Andrzej Drzycimski 
and Tadeusz Skutnik, Gdansk Sierpien '80 (Gdansk: AIDA, 1990); Polski Sierpien, 1980 
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peared that the final stage of the Gierek plan had been completed and a prece-
dent set for removing government subsidies on foodstuffs. Human factors inter-
vened. Anna Walentynowicz, a nurse in the shipyards, found an open micro-
phone and called on workers not to forget that they had also gotten promises in 
1970 only to have them ignored later. Messengers came from the Szczecin ship-
yards to ask the Gdansk workers not to simply agree to concessions for them-
selves but to make their demands universal so that smaller, less influential ship-
yards could benefit too. And the seeds for Solidarity were sown. 
None of this appears to have been anticipated by the political leadership. 
The directors and managers had already left the shipyards to celebrate their 
victory on August 14, 1980, when Walentynowicz issued her call. Gierek was in 
the Crimea on a vacation with Soviet leaders. His deputies failed for two days 
even to notify him about the transformation of the shipyard strikes. This gave 
the strikers three extra days to organize, formulate their demands, and develop a 
negotiating base. It made the reins of government control appear particularly 
loose to both conservatives in the PUWP apparatus and to potentially semiloyal 
or oppositional groups that were both established (KOR and the Church) and 
nascent ( worker and intellectual groupings). Throughout 1980-81 and in the 
decade afterwards, this underestimation of the opposition's popular strength 
continued. 
When Gierek did return from the Soviet Union, a series of mixed signals 
were sent. The striking coastal cities were completely cut off from the rest of 
Poland. Major roads were blocked into Gdansk. Telephone and telegraph lines 
were down. Media coverage only talked about "work stoppages." At the same 
time, the government forces' hold on Gdansk was ineffective. People and in-
formation went in and out constantly. During the strikes, Warsaw academics and 
intellectuals met and sent delegates to caution the strikers. Journalists went to 
see what was happening and returned with their tales. Dissident representatives 
carried messages to Western correspondents. Their reports were quickly re-
broadcast into Poland. Church representatives went in and out of the shipyard 
freely . In fact, the people most reluctant to travel to the striking towns were 
party officials. 
Later, in the last two weeks of the strikes, a government-run press center 
for foreign journalists was established in the striking shipyards. Negotiations 
were begun even as the strikes were alternately attacked and ignored in the me-
dia. The strike agreements were drawn up and agreed to without any mention of 
party rights or control. Instead, the enactment rested on the passage of laws by 
the parliament. Government negotiators conceded to the strikers' demands for 
recognition of their newly formed union and their right to strike. They also ac-
(New York: Biblioteka Pomostu, 1983); Gdansk, 1980 (London: Polonia Book Fund, 
1980); and Jerzy Surdykowski, Notatki Gdanskie (London: Aneks, 1982). 
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knowledged that the Catholic Church and others should be given access to the 
mass media for religious broadcasts and discussions of different points of view. 7 
The signing of the Gdansk agreement on August 31, 1980, and parallel 
agreements by other groups of Baltic shipyard workers and miners in the Sile-
sian coalfields had far more than a local union character. Delegations from other 
shipyards came to the shipyards to ask for inclusion of them and their demands. 
During all these negotiations, the presence of a deputy prime minister, other 
ministers, and top government officials made the negotiations even more na-
tional. The universal impact of Poland's economic crisis and intellectuals' pres-
ence as advisors to workers made this the first clear crisis where workers and 
prominent intellectuals were actively aligned against the government. Finally, 
the broadcast of the signing of the Gdansk agreements made them appear to be a 
new national political accord, even though the party leadership treated the ac-
cords as merely a necessary response to the public's wrath over the failings of 
the old system. 
In the almost three months between the signing of the accords and court 
approval of the independent union's charter in November 1980, the situation 
grew more complicated. Local priorities took over, since Solidarity could not 
build a national organization until it was officially registered. Instead, individu-
als simply declared a union into existence in their workplace. Those who wished 
to sign up and paid the assigned dues became members. Others simply came to 
Solidarity's open meetings. By November, nearly nine million people had 
joined various ostensibly local organizations. Their leaders were self-appointed. 
Their power depended not on their established positions but on what they could 
deliver for their clients. Strikes, whether or not they were fully legalized, be-
came the standard vehicle for achieving local goals. The primary national goal 
was the legal registration of the trade union. To this end, local organizations 
entered into informal alliances that allowed the Gdansk team (symbolized by 
Lech Walesa) to speak for the as yet illegal Solidarity in negotiations with the 
authorities. 8 
This spontaneous activity continued even after the courts had formally le-
galized the Solidarity trade union (NSZZ "Solidarnosc"). Individuals and groups 
of individuals simply declared themselves under the banner of Solidarity and 
acted as they saw fit. "Journals" were published because individuals had access 
to printing presses or mimeograph machines, strikes were called in local areas 
7 "The Gdansk Agreement, August 31, 1980" as translated in Poland: Genesis of a 
Revolution, Abraham Bromberg, ed. (New York: Random House, 1983), p. 287. 
8 For a discussion of the development of the Solidarity movement, see David Ost, 
Solidarity and Politics of Anti-politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990); Jerzy Holzer, "Solidarnosc" 1980-1981: 
geneza i historia (Warsaw: Omnipress, I 990); and Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity: 
a Political Sociology of Poland Working Class Democratization (Princeton, N.J.: Prince-
ton University Press, I 991 ). For a record of the negotiations, see A. Kemp-Welch, The 
Birth of Solidarity (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). 
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over large and small local issues, and open meetings were announced and held 
by whoever took the initiative. Professional activities and groups were enli-
vened. New leaders were selected and old, long-submerged demands put forth. 
Academics, journalists, and self-styled experts in all fields started to advise 
the new reformers. When intellectual groups held meetings, they were almost 
always open, not just to the limited membership of a given group, but to anyone 
who wanted to come and listen. In addition, through the leadership of Stanislaw 
Szaniawski, a professor of philosophy at the University of Warsaw, and the new 
leaders of various intellectual groups, a Coordinating Committee of Polish Intel-
lectual Associations took upon itself the task of negotiating with the government 
and Solidarity on various legal points that specifically concerned Polish intellec-
tuals and professionals, such as the censorship law and reforms of academic 
governance, all the while keeping in mind the necessity of protecting Solidarity.9 
Finally, those who were outside the membership bounds of Solidarity 
(private farmers and university students) began, after Solidarity had been regis-
tered, to press for their own unions. These unions were more politically threat-
ening by their very nature, so they were not readily recognized by the govern-
ment. After all, student demands were, from the beginning, for a revision not 
only of authority relations in the university but also for removing ideology from 
the curriculum. Private farmers sought a union through which their rather tenu-
ous position would be protected. Although this was a less drastic demand than 
the recognition of a workers' union in a "workers' state," the Communist lead-
ers could not ignore the fact that Polish farmers had forced the regime to give in 
on collectivization. That made a private farmers' union a difficult pill to swal-
low. As a result, strikes to press for the formation of these unions occurred over 
and over during the first six months after Solidarity's birth and resulted in more 
open conflicts and far less rapid concessions than workers had achieved. 
All of this "pluralism" meant that union leaders were involved on two 
fronts from the start. On the one hand, they were attempting to use threats of 
mass action to force concessions from the government. On the other hand, given 
the visibly bad economic realities and the demands of the government that they 
demonstrate leadership and authority by "controlling" their members, Walesa 
and his Gdansk cadre were forced to press new groups and members not to 
strike. This left the self-appointed heroes of Solidarity open for challenges by 
new leaders from newer organizations, all of whom used the Gdansk Accords as 
a base and sought to wring even more gains out of their local leaders. 
As had happened after the workers' strikes of 1956 and 1970, the initial 
regime response was to oust the top, publicly visible party leaders. This time, 
however, there were no clear alternative "answers" waiting in the wings. The 
process of bureaucratization and unification of the party around the Gierek 
clique had destroyed the possibilities for anyone in the regime to develop a 
broad base of support. Nor was a change in the national party leadership ever 
9 Tadeusz Kowalik, "Experts and the Working Group" in A. Kemp-Welch, The Birth 
of Solidarity, pp. 149-87. 
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one of the strikers' goals. Kania's leadership-in line with his quiet personality 
and the general balance of forces within the party-was that of a buffer and 
mediator, not a leader. The others around him checkmated each other to protect 
their positions rather than building downward links or cementing permanent 
ideological groups.10 
The party leadership was divided from the outset on how to respond to 
Solidarity's birth and growth. In initial public statements, the basic line was that 
there had been excesses in the behavior of the leaders under the Gierek and that 
these had weakened the party and hurt the economy. Solidarity was treated in 
many of the public statements of top leaders as an independent force that 
emerged because the old unions had lost their authority. Local strikes were dealt 
with as local phenomena requiring local negotiations. The strategy was appar-
ently to oust or transfer leaders who represented unpopular policies, to take 
strong measures against a few symbols of the worst excesses, to make the re-
quired political concessions as slowly as possible, and to minimize workers' 
hopes of getting what they had been promised by engaging in the "propaganda 
of disaster" and stressing the economic crisis in which Poland found itself. 
This general line was played out in a battle between those who thought 
there was no need to tolerate Solidarity and those who thought it was a way to 
give workers a way to feel involved. The result was that actions were seldom 
consistent with words. Party leaders with different stances toward the liberaliza-
tion held posts in competing party and government agencies. Their directives 
reflected their individual positions and power needs, not any coherent policy. 
The agreements signed with striking workers promised them a union and the 
right to strike. The mass media and the court decisions required to actualize 
these agreements initially reneged on or minimized them. Most crucially, in 
November 1980 the court, in authorizing the legal registration of the union, in-
serted a provision stating that the union had to recognize the supremacy of the 
party. This was done without warning and against the will of the union organiz-
ers.11 
Effectively, this all triggered an unhealthy chain of events for the party that 
left its leaders fractionalized, disgraced, and powerless over their own bureauc-
racy. The chain began when, almost immediately after the agreements were 
signed, the new party leaders began attacks on the corruption and abuse of 
power by leaders around Gierek. These attacks, like the shifts in leaders, served 
10 Perhaps the initial and symbolic indication of this change was the fact that the ap-
pointment of Stanislaw Kania, who, after all, had been the party secretary in charge of 
the police and unpopular Church policies, did not even interest the newly activated 
population. Nor did they seek to meet with the new leaders as they had in the past. 
Kania's leadership followed this pattern of disinterest in the party. Poles neither pro-
tested the appointment of the man who had supervised two of Poland' s most contentious 
institutions nor rallied around him, as they had Gierek when he criticized the party and 
called for reform. Essentially, grassroots movements simply went on. 
11 Ruane, The Polish Challenge, p. 73. 
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as a substitute for making new policy. But, since corruption and inequality had 
become the modus vivendi for party and state officials at all levels, the attack on 
corruption turned into a cleansing that swept out ever larger circles of party and 
state leaders. The public's negative image of its leadership from the 1970s was 
not ameliorated. It was confirmed and magnified. The revelations served not as 
excuses for past mistakes but as reasons why workers' demands should not be 
restrained by the legacy of economic problems. This, coupled with the fact that 
many of the "new" leaders were from outside the party and government estab-
lishment, made it difficult for the new leaders to control "their'' bureaucracy. 
Reformers in the party began, in early 1981, to consider reforms that involved 
paring down the party and state administrative and economic bureaucracies that 
had grown under Gierek. All of this, given the bureaucracy's sense of its power 
in the 1970s, resulted in a dramatic split and distrust between many policy mak-
ers and administrators. 12 
Yet, in the Solidarity period, to an even greater degree than in the 1970s, 
bureaucrats became governors. Party and government leaders were new to the 
bureaucracies they "ruled" and were internally divided. This meant they were 
dependent on bureaucrats. Even though a substantial number of state bureau-
crats joined Solidarity, particularly from the economic bureaucracy, there was a 
clear split between their "private" selves and their bureaucratic interests. Thus, 
unlike the bureaucrats of 1956, many of whom left their positions or pushed for 
their own bureaucracies to be dissolved, bureaucrats in 1980 supported all the 
aims and principles of Solidarity except those that would have reduced their 
bureaucratic powers. One of their prime concerns was to protect their own 
autonomy against reformist pressures that threatened to abolish their adminis-
trative positions or subject their previously unassailable decisions and actions to 
public examination. In addition, they engaged in conscious and unconscious 
interpretations of the new regulations to make them consistent with what they 
had done before and with their needs as bureaucrats. 13 All of this made establish-
ing the new order promised by party leaders even more problematic, especially 
since the bureaucracy was strongest in the areas most challenged by Solidarity: 
the mass media, the security forces, and the economic administration. 
Below the roughly two hundred people holding positions in the top central 
party and state elite and the rest of the entrenched party apparatus, 14 the party 
membership lived its own life between August 1980 and March 1981. Party 
members were seldom recruited or encouraged to be ideologically aware in the 
1970s, when many joined to get or keep good jobs. They were shaken by the 
appearance of Solidarity. In the initial months, many moved to join Solidarity 
12 Interview data, 1983. 
13 Interview data, 1979 and 1983. 
14 Paul G. Lewis, Political Authority and Party Secretaries in Poland 1975- 1986 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Antoni Sulek, "The Polish 
United Worker' s Party: From Mobilization to Non-representation," Soviet Studies 42, no. 
3 (July 1990), pp. 499- 513. 
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while retaining their party membership. At the same time, some, particularly 
those in large urban industrial areas with a young population, moved to create a 
new party by fiat. They even held their own, unsanctioned elections for new 
officers and for delegates to a special party congress. This they did before party 
leaders had agreed to call any special congress. 
It was these "renegades" who emerged as a real force in the lower ranks of 
the party in the late fall and early winter of 1981. Initially, individuals in the 
intellectual centers of Torun and Cracow and the site of the 1956 uprising 
(Poznan) had carried out their own elections for new leaders after local party 
leaders dragged their heels in the democratization of the party. Defying the old 
vertical control structures of democratic centralism, they simply bypassed party 
leaders and talked to their peers elsewhere. Essentially, these contacts served to 
encourage reformist action within the party's lower ranks by direct group com-
munication about what they were doing to democratize local party groups. The 
combination of intellectual guidance and the general frustration of low-level 
party activists led them to make national demands. Because the party bureauc-
racy feared that this movement would deplete their power base, these so called 
horizontalist groups were an ideological lightning rod for the party in early 
1981. The movement's initial instigator was dropped from his party position, 
only to be returned to it by an unauthorized vote at the local level of the party. 
Hard-liners made reference to the horizontalists as a threat to national stability. 
At the same time, other liberal party leaders flirted with the horizontalists and, 
in doing so, gave their actions even more significance in national politics and to 
the Soviet Union. 15 
Foreign Actors 
During this time, both Western and Soviet actors were constrained from 
"doing something about Poland" by their broader world interests. Poland was 
dependent on Western loans and aid but did not have the funds to make its debt 
payments. Western bankers were concerned lest Poland default on its debt, as 
that would have meant an overwhelming loss for some Western European banks 
in the midst of a worldwide economic recession. They also wanted to avoid 
sending the message to other heavily indebted nations that default had few if 
any consequences, lest nations even more indebted than Poland should simply 
allow themselves to "go under." 16 The Soviets needed Poland to pay its debts on 
its own and not drain more hard currency from the already fragile Soviet econ-
omy. They insisted that Poland pay up; if Poland defaulted it would not only 
hurt Western banks, but would also hurt Council for Mutual Economic Assis-
tance (CMEA) members' ability to trade and borrow from the West. The desire 
to protect the detente on which the Brezhnev regime had concentrated also was 
15 Interview data, 1983. 
16 Interview data, 1981 . 
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significant enough in 1980 to increase Soviet tolerance of what would have been 
unthinkable concessions in earlier years and forced the Soviets to keep up costly 
economic aid to Poland to prevent it from defaulting.17 
Politically, to risk an invasion or early repression of the Solidarity move-
ment, which had instantly become the media fascination of the West, seemed to 
risk an end of that detente, a halt to trade with the technologically more ad-
vanced West, and a narrowing of the division between the United States and 
Western Europe. Naturally, there is no way to weigh the real impact of each of 
these factors or to know how clearly top Soviet leaders understood the intelli-
gence information they received about events in Poland. But they made it obvi-
ous that they would tolerate some change but not let Poland go too far.18 
To further complicate the role of foreign powers in Polish developments, 
the leadership in both the West and the Soviet Union were very unstable and 
unpredictable. In the initial months of change in Poland, the United States, 
France, England, and West Germany went through elections that were marked 
by dramatic shifts to the right everywhere but France. Poland, as a result, be-
came a useful political symbol in domestic political battles. 
Public Western reaction was enthusiastic about Solidarity and its suc-
cesses. As a result, Poles thought aid would come. At the same time, there was 
little actual commitment of funds for Poland. Lame-duck or campaigning poli-
ticians put off any actual commitments from their own economically troubled 
countries until things got settled after their elections. Once the elections were 
over, the new leaders were so tied up with getting started and dealing with their 
own economic problems that they did not have time to concentrate on Poland. 
Soviet involvement was under similar constraints. The Brezhnev leader-
ship was aged and facing a leadership transition of its own. For them, the 
changes in Poland were virtually inconceivable. All they could comprehend was 
that the troublesome Poles had to be settled down again by concessions that they 
thought would soon fade. In addition, although they wished to hold back change 
in Poland and lessen its impact on the rest of the bloc, their willingness to 
openly intervene was limited both by their commitment to detente and their in-
creasingly costly commitment to holding on to Afghanistan, after their invasion 
there in December 1979. 
The Economy 
The economic situation in which these events occurred made either calm-
ing popular economic demands or simply repressing the movement difficult if 
not impossible. It put Poland between the West and the Soviet Union. In the first 
place, Poland' s massive debt to the West, coupled with the Brezhnev-era em-
17 See Radio Free Europe Research, "17- 19 September, 1980" (Munich: Radio Free 
Europe, 1980). 
18 Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Jak to sie sta/o? (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 21-33 and Ta-
j ne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego (London: Aneks, 1992). 
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phasis on detente and cooperation with the West, made the potential of the West 
an important factor in political and economic decisions. For the Polish leader-
ship, the solution was to borrow even more money from the West to keep the 
economy afloat and to get enough raw materials to continue production for ex-
port and for basic domestic demands. In the second place, the Polish leadership 
had to get infusions of some hard currency from the Soviet Union to satisfy 
Western financiers and simply keep the economy functioning. This required 
acting in terms the Soviets could tolerate. · 
Domestically, the inevitable collapse of the economy was speeded up by 
agreements between the workers and the government on pay increases and in-
creased benefits. In July and August 1980, when these had been drawn up, there 
had been no attempt to account for their actual cost. Instead, separate agree-
ments were made by local managers and negotiators with striking workers. The 
cost of the agreement was the least of their concerns. These agreements were 
simply products of individuals' negotiating skills and the power of an industry 
and its managers. The agreements were met by printing more money. This only 
increased the gap between supply and demand. So, as workers earned more 
without having to produce more, they had more and more money when less and 
less was available. 
Agricultural developments in Poland further complicated the economic 
equation. Over half the peasant population was over sixty years old. Long-term 
mismanagement and regime disinterest in agriculture had further reduced farm 
production. In addition, the summer and fall of 1980 had been marked by bad 
weather. Finally, shortages of hard currency increased the use of agricultural 
products as hard-currency export earners while decreasing the supply of grains, 
fertilizers, and equipment normally imported from the West. 19 
All this left Poland on the verge of an economic disaster. There was a 
ballooning debt when not even the necessities were available and hard-currency 
earnings were droppirtg. The polity was fragmented at all levels and the possi-
bility of any internal or external actor acting effectively was virtually nonexist-
ent. 
Breakdown 
The responses of all the players to the crisis and to each others' actions led to 
the first total breakdown in postwar Poland's history. It was a breakdown so 
deep that it was impossible even to fully terrorize the population into submission 
when a "state of war" was finally imposed. 
19 See Alain Pouliquen, "The Structural Modernization of Polish Private Agriculture: 
The Turning Point of the 1980s," Comparative Economic Studies 31, no. 2 (Summer 
1989), p. 66. 
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Political Events 
This period began in March 1981 with the beatings of farmers in Byd-
goszcz who demanded the right to establish their own union by occupying local 
government headquarters. They were attacked and beaten by the police. Only a 
four-hour national Solidarity warning strike and threats of a national strike, 
along with Church protests, forced the government to admit that there had been 
police brutality. Even then, there was no direct admission that any national unit 
had been involved or that central directions had been given. Instead, all that was 
clear was that the Iegime would do no more than make a minimal admission of 
low-level administrative wrongdoing.20 The breakdown period then continued 
until the fall of 1982, when martial law was suspended. 
The Bydgoszcz incident was the first instance of force being used against 
strikers in the post-August period. It was also the most dramatic in a series of 
strikes focused on local economic issues and the improprieties and privileges of 
local party and government officials. As these local strikes happened, they grew 
into ever broader and more general attacks on the system, taking on a life of 
their own. The strike that followed the Bydgoszcz beatings was the first national 
strike, or the threat of one, used as a weapon to force concessions on local is-
sues. 
Even so, Bydgoszcz was only one of the events in March 1981 that marked 
the breakdown. Not only was Solidarity increasingly restless, but the party 
membership itself was radicalizing. The congress that party reformers had been 
promised was delayed. So grassroots horizontalist movements met independ-
ently of the party leadership. Under this local pressure, the Ninth Plenum of the 
PUWP Central Committee met on March 30, 1981 (ten days after the beatings in 
Bydgoszcz), and began the process of setting up the election machinery for the 
Extraordinary Congress. This opened the doors for local party bodies to hold 
secret-ballot elections and negotiations over most of the seats at the congress. At 
the same time, party leaders ordered party members not to join or remain in 
Solidarity.21 This marked a clear shift from treating the new union movement as 
a problem created by the Gierek era to be incorporated or co-opted into the ex-
isting party system, to treating it as a threat to the system whose faults were 
caused by the "anti-system" KOR intellectuals. 
Finally, in March 1981, public protest over the Bydgoszcz events and the 
possibility that the party would give up too much in dealing with this rebellion 
at its lower levels triggered the Soviet Union to make its first clearly articulated 
public suggestion, beyond the periodic military exercises on Poland's borders, 
that, if Poland could not put its own house in order, others in the Soviet Bloc 
would have to. Polish events became "bloc events," as confirmed by the March 
Soviet letter, the attacks on Poland by East European delegates at the Czech and 
20 Ruane, The Polish Challenge, pp. 138-89. 
21 For a discussion of these events as breakdown events, see Andrews, Poland 1980-
1981, pp. 132-35. 
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later East German Party Congress, and Soviet troop maneuvers. The Soviet in-
tent, though, was not consistent. Bloc members and even the Soviet leaders 
could not agree on the trustworthiness of the leadership, the immediate necessity 
of intervention, and the nature of a viable intervention. So, in the midst of major 
Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Southern Poland, Brezhnev stated at the Czech Con-
gress that Polish leaders should and could be entrusted with regulating their own 
affairs.22 
All these events were the first sketches of what was to become the pattern 
of breakdown in Poland. There were breakdowns of any sense of cohesive and 
coherent group direction; of public authority ( eventually not only of the party 
and state but also of the Solidarity leadership itself); of the authorities' ability to 
control their subordinates and the broader population's actions; of the economy; 
and of the limit on foreign incursions into domestic affairs. For the "loyal or 
semiloyal opposition" that had originally respected the rules of the system and 
shared common goals, this period was a time when they fragmented into smaller 
and increasingly contentious groupings involved in battles both with the regime 
and with other opposition actors. Finally, it was a time in which events and di-
visions rendered impossible the creation of any opposition or regime strategy for 
reform or compromise. 
Ironically, this period was also a time for public and formal meetings insti-
tutionalizing the new Solidarity unions and reform proposals. It was a period of 
intensive discussions about economic reform and the preparation of laws to put 
more democratic structures into place. Too, both the "establishment" and Soli-
darity took definitive actions to institutionalize or reinstitutionalize themselves: 
elections and national congresses were held by Solidarity; the PUWP held an 
Extraordinary Congress; Polish intellectual organizations and the two minor 
parties held conferences to "cleanse" themselves; the Church became a power 
that played an institutionalized role between the regime and Solidarity;23 and, 
finally, a so-called state of war put Poland under formal military and police rule. 
Yet, none of these actions halted the fragmentation and disintegration of author-
ity at every level and from every political posture. Groups deadlocked each 
other and fragmentation merely made resolution of any part of the crisis more 
difficult. 
Party and state officials were not in control of their own options. Nor was 
there an agreed-upon strategy for resolving crises anywhere in the society. The 
past pattern for Communist reform movements did not occur: elites, this time, 
did not compete by seeking support from groups in the society. Instead, events 
in the party and in the society occurred separately. Few links were made be-
tween political factions' leaders and members of dissenting groups. And, as the 
breakdown progressed, even informal links that had held the intelligentsia to-
22 See Ruane, The Polish Challenge; Andrews, Poland 1980-1981, and Sidney I. 
Ploss, Moscow and the Polish Crisis (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986). 
23 For a study of the Church in this period, see Piotr Nitecki, Czlowiek droga kosciola 
(Warsaw: Osrodek Dokumentacji i Studiow Spolecznych, 1987). 
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gether dissolved. This meant that regime leaders were increasingly isolated from 
everything but bureaucratic reports on conditions in the society. Their focus was 
almost exclusively on their own power politics. 
Initially, in the breakdown period (from March 1981 until July 1981), the 
focus was on preparations for the Extraordinary Party Congress. At the mem-
bership level, for the intelligentsia in the party, open and secret elections for 
delegates were a real opportunity to take action. For workers, they were of little 
interest since Solidarity elections were going on at almost the same time. These 
party elections, though, were no less contested. Some longtime, high-level 
Communist officials were even voted out by their primary party organizations. 
Public and critical electioneering by the various factions within the leader-
ship made the divisions very clear to the public. There were sharp and some-
times personal attacks on individuals and ideas from other factions. Liberals 
sought far-reaching decentralization and an opening up of the party and state 
administration. Conservatives argued that the party bureaucracy should be re-
built and strengthened so that the party could lead. Both sides (and Kania's cen-
trists) justified the need for change with the threat of a total social collapse and 
the suggestion that this collapse would bring a Soviet intervention. This open 
division and the chaos of the election battles made preparation of a program or 
enacting real reforms impossible before the Party Congress. Instead, democratic 
elections were the party leadership ' s only proof that change was being made. 
In the end, these very election procedures, the party' s evidence of reform, 
made the party leadership look worse. The Extraordinary Party Congress' 1,948 
delegates were selected from lists of candidates that included far more names 
than there were seats. Selections were made by voters crossing off those they 
did not want. This negative balloting made name recognition often the main 
criterion for selecting from the Central Committee candidates. As a result, little-
known delegates were elected to the Central Committee and other committees 
because their names did not have any connection with the past. Many of the 
party ' s well-known figures, in turn, were removed by this process. In their 
place, weak unknowns were elected. The shift even affected Politburo member-
ship: it strengthened the four established leaders elected to the Politburo, since 
the others elected by the congress were such unknowns that they had no real 
hold on power.24 
Aside from this demonstration of "democracy," however, the PUWP con-
gress did little. Commissions prepared reports on party and state policy but 
could not agree on substantial proposals. Criticism of the past repeated accusa-
tions made earlier. Traditional promises of an even better future were not made. 
The new line, expressed by Wojciech Jaruzelski as the head of government, was 
that economic conditions could only get much worse, since the government had 
24 George Sanford, "The Response of the Polish Communist Leadership to the Con-
tinuing Crisis (Summer 1980 to the Ninth Congress, July, 1981 )" in Jean Woodall, ed., 
Policy and Politics in Contemporary Poland (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), pp. 33- 55. 
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no way to stem the tide. For the public, all of this demonstrated the incompe-
tence and weakness of the party as a leadership force. 
The post-congress period was marked by a general collapse within the 
party. By the party's own reports, the general desertion of members began in the 
fall of 1981 and picked up speed after the declaration of martial law.25 Even 
those who stayed retreated from active involvement. Local meetings focused on 
local problems and relations with local union groups rather than national issues. 
The center's only contact came in its expulsions of the local members it consid-
ered too liberal. Then, too, with the resignation of Kania in September 1981, the 
party ceased to play a real role separate from the state. After all, Gen. Wojciech 
Jaruzelski took over not as an established party leader but as a man whose status 
came from his position in the military. The concept of the party's authority and 
leadership simply disappeared from party statements and actions. 
Between March 1981 and December 1982, when martial law was sus-
pended, fragmentation occurred outside the party as well. Even more critical in 
the breakdown was the spread of open attitude differences and group conflict 
throughout the society. As surveys of members of various social groups during 
this period demonstrated, while there was a general social agreement on the 
faults of the system, there were increasingly clear class lines between workers 
and intellectuals that were reinforced by a fragmentation of views as to who 
should lead and how; who had benefited from the failures of the old system; and 
what a viable new system would be.26 In addition, the fragmentation of the Soli-
darity movement and intellectual groups into policy groupings with different 
views on economic reform and Poland's political direction was more than a 
simple search for alternatives. Inherent in it was a commitment to and advocacy 
of specific individual interests and positions. Solidarity fragmented into various 
leadership factions. Intellectuals, even those active in Solidarity, saw their inter-
ests as different from the workers' and held to their own professional preroga-
tives. The siec concept developed when leading factories decided to form policy 
units of their own to work on economic reform programs when they felt Soli-
darity had failed to act or had not pressed to solve the needs of the big factories 
they represented.27 In the post-martial law period, the division grew not only 
between the population and martial law authorities but also within the intellec-
tual establishment. It fragmented into groups bitterly divided over the moral 
stance to take toward martial law. 
The actual agenda of the Solidarity leadership and other smaller, inde-
pendent trade unions, after the events in Bydgoszcz, turned more political. The 
beatings and the subsequent struggle with the government as well as the inabil-
25 See Sulek, "The Polish United Worker's Party." 
26 Wladyslaw Adamski et al., Polacy, 1981 (Warsaw: PAN Institute of Philosophy and 
Sociology, 1982) and Miroslawa Marody, Polacy, 1980 (Warsaw: University of Warsaw: 
Institute of Sociology, 1981) provide remarkable empirical studies of public opinion and 
perceptions in this period. 
27 Interview data, 1981 and 1983. 
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ity of the unions to deliver on their economic or social promises, led, in part, to 
a reorientation of the unions. Internal battles increased as radicals, urging less 
compromise, rose to the top. Their rise was aided by the failing economic situa-
tion and the increasing sense in the union and the population that there was no 
way to resolve the conflict with the party and state authorities. 21 
Divisions took on sharper foci as Solidarity's leadership and policy be-
came more and more national. Lech Walesa and his co-leaders spoke and ap-
peared as national union leaders. A weekly, Tygodnik So/idarnosc, was organ-
ized as an official and legal national journal to augment the plethora of local 
and unauthorized journals. In the course of this nationalization and the prepara-
tions for the first national congress of Solidarity, public divisions in views and 
in the leadership became the order of the day. The election process further 
crystallized the divisions in Solidarity. There were no previously elected leaders. 
Few who ran were known even to their local groups or to the other delegates 
representing the 9,486,000 Poles in Solidarity. So candidates from 5,568 dis-
tricts (1 ,500 to 1,900 members, each based on factories, combinations of offices, 
or workplaces) drew attention to themselves and their views by making dramatic 
promises in open, mass election meetings. From these locally elected nominees, 
individuals were selected to be candidates in the forty-two regional-level meet-
ings from which 892 national delegates were elected. 
The regional meetings were open forums. All nominees from work units 
were allowed to give five-minute presentations to Solidarity members, who 
came to what were often two- to three-day meetings. In the end, whoever was at 
the meetings when the vote was called was polled to select regional delegates. 
Individuals thus sought to articulate what made them different, not what made 
them "representative." This encouraged extremism. Too few knew the dismal 
realities of the economic and political situation. Their targets of criticism were 
most often the self-appointed leaders of Solidarity whom they sought to join or 
replace and whom they criticized for not bringing Poles an instantly better life. 
As a result, the delegates reflected both generational splits and radicaliza-
tion. Of the 701 delegates surveyed by the congress ' s research group, 50.5 per-
cent were under 35; 30.6 percent from 36 to 45; and 16.8 percent from 46 to 55. 
And 74.2 percent of the delegates were from towns of over 50,000 (43.2 percent 
from industrial and mining establishments), even though most Poles lived in 
smaller towns. At the same time, the delegates had the backgrounds to make 
them potentially independent actors: 30.3 percent were in supervisory positions 
and 16.5 percent were present or former party members (the forum in the 1970s 
for those who wanted to be heard).29 
The distance between Solidarity leaders and its rank and file increased 
significantly during this period. Union leaders like Walesa became international 
celebrities and heard what the economic realities facing Poland were from gov-
28 See Adamski, et al. , Polacy, 1981. 
29 The Solidarity Congress, 1981, George Sanford, ed. (London: Macmillan, 1990), 
pp. 4-5. 
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ernment and Western officials. While the union leadership turned to threats of 
national strikes to get access to television, force concessions, and have a greater 
voice in economic decisions, they found their negotiating powers weakened by 
spontaneous local strikes over increasingly radical, unspecific, and local politi-
cal issues. To insure that independent strikes did not make it impossible to 
achieve national goals, Solidarity leaders continually intervened in these local 
battles. This, and the spreading sense that every group had the right to use 
strikes to resolve issues, brought with it a shift to strikes that were basically po-
litical in their goals. Demands for the release of specific political prisoners or for 
the shift of specific facilities from government ministries to public use were 
symbols of broader political pressures to reduce the independence and power of 
the bureaucracy and political establishment. Others joined local strikes that were 
verging on success to raise specific demands even though Solidarity leaders 
begged them to hold back for the good of the whole. Finally, Solidarity politi-
cians' focus on political gains was increasingly hollow as most Poles felt in-
creasingly trapped by the economic problems Poland faced and the failure of the 
union and the government either to deal with or resolve these problems. 
The Solidarity Congress in September 1981 30 and the meetings that oc-
curred before each of the two sessions were clear demonstrations of the union's 
popular strength and determination. They were also forums for division, dem-
onstrating that cooperation with the party and state could no longer be a primary 
goal, given the other priorities of the membership and young leadership. 
These congressional sessions were, in all dimensions, purely Solidarity's. 
Government and party officials did not give the kind of symbolic speeches they 
had given at official gatherings of supposedly "independent" organizations in 
the pre-Solidarity era. The only appearance of a government representative was, 
in fact, the result of the demand of the delegates for an explanation of the sud-
den increase in cigarette prices during the Congress. State radio and television 
were even barred by Solidarity because they were accused of not reporting Soli-
darity's activities fully and fairly in the past. 
At the same time, although there was a fairly universal lack of support for 
the government and party among the delegates, there were dramatic differences 
in the diagnoses of what the causes and resolutions of Poland's difficulties 
would be, what the limits on feasible actions were, and what the union's role 
should be. These differences were articulated in public sessions and also in 
meetings of various working groups set up to develop platforms on issues rang-
ing from economic reform to media policy. These began before the congress 
and continued throughout its two sessions. In many critical areas, the splits on 
these specific issues were so deep that single policy proposals were not made. In 
the open sessions themselves, these splits and the chaos that resulted led to un-
planned issues-like a call for workers elsewhere in Eastern Europe to join 
30 This section on the Solidarity Congress is based on Western and Polish press cover-
age, interviews done in 1981 and 1983 with participants; and Sanford, The Solidarity 
Congress, pp. 4-5. 
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Solidarity-being raised from the floor and voted on without either the knowl-
edge or support of the leadership. 
The process of selecting delegates brought forth clear signs of dissension 
and opposition to any strong leadership. The initial focus of the congress was on 
the election of the chairman of the union. Three more radical leaders competed 
with Walesa for election. Their speeches and presentations stressed the failures 
of the existing Solidarity leadership to push for concessions and change. In the 
end, Walesa won with 55 .2 percent of the vote and Marian Jurczak, the most 
trade union-oriented of the candidates, who had stressed the need for pay in-
creases as a first political and economic step, got the next largest percentage 
(24.0 percent). The election of the National Coordinating Commission members 
to serve alongside the regional chairmen then took six rounds to complete. 
Candidates representing individual districts were voted on by the entire conven-
tion membership. Those who got a majority were seated. The remaining seats 
were filled after election battles had been completed between the candidates 
who remained. In this complex and lengthy process, a number of Solidarity's 
original advisors and leaders Iost.3' 
In the end, the Solidarity Congress increased government and party oppo-
sition to Solidarity. It also revealed that Solidarity was not a solid organization 
with programs and structures for resolving Poland's problems. Very few con-
crete proposals were supported by enough delegates to be passed. The ones 
dealing with critical national problems ( economic reform, restructuring of the 
budget, social priorities, and the nature of Solidarity's political position in the 
future) were matters of obvious and unresolvable division. Even Solidarity's 
position on the parliament's self-management bill, which passed in the parlia-
ment, was approved by the leadership of Solidarity between the August and 
September sessions of the Solidarity Congress but then not ratified by the dele-
gates at the second session. While the National Coordinating Commission dealt 
with economic reform, other alternative worker-based organizations split off 
because they perceived Solidarity as unable to deal with such policy questions. 
The newly elected and legitimized National Coordinating Commission was 
further hamstrung by the union structure established at the Congress. Instead of 
being empowered to lead and represent the union as a national unit, the coordi-
nating commission was limited to coordinating but not directing or legislating 
for independent local unions.32 This perpetuated and encouraged regional and 
even work-unit divisions in Solidarity. When government, Church, and Solidar-
ity negotiations began, this meant Walesa had to negotiate without the support 
of his coordinating board because it maintained that the entire board should be 
included and one voice could not speak for Solidarity. 
The resulting drop in public trust'3 and the fragmentation of Solidarity into 
political, generational, and regional groupings was further exacerbated by the 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See Adamski, et al., Polacy, 1981 . 
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economic situation. Solidarity was drawn into trying to resolve the nation's eco-
nomic problems because the government appeared to be doing nothing. When it 
did, it appeared to be working against workers' short-term interests and support-
ing price increases and austerity measures. Hope for real change diminished 
daily. A complete and public debunking of Gierek-era promises of rapid indus-
trialization and dramatic quantitative and qualitative increases in living stan-
dards was done on both sides. There were not enough raw materials to keep 
factories running and virtually nothing to be sold in the stores. Overall, the gross 
national product dropped, by some estimates, over 15 percent in 1981.34 For the 
society, long before martial law was declared, this meant empty hours in facto-
ries and stores with workers and clerks but nothing to make or sell. Poles at all 
levels found themselves increasingly dependent on a rapidly expanding ration-
ing system to get scarce goods. And, even with rationing, by the late summer 
and fall of 1981, finding basic rationed foods had become as critical a problem 
as finding soap, clothes, and other consumer essentials. During this period, the 
government admitted supplies were so short that there had to be cutbacks in 
rations of basic goods themselves. Those who could bartered what they had. 
This, plus the constant discussions and revelations on the special privileges of 
party and government officials, triggered many strikes. But, given the state of 
the economy, the government could make no promises that life would improve. 
It could only make symbolic admissions that its predecessors of the 1970s had 
wrongly benefited from the economy and had done irreparable damage. As time 
went on, the collapse of the economy came to be more and more symbolic of the 
complete incompetence of the party and state leaders and those who had worked 
under them or, worse, of a deliberate policy of the government. 
The failures in the industrial sector were followed (and matched) by fail-
ures in the agricultural sector. Since there was nothing to buy on the normal 
market and since government purchase prices did not match production costs for 
goods, peasants worked in a basically barter economy-trading livestock with 
factory units that offered them goods they wanted or with individuals who paid 
in Western currency or scarce goods or services (including medical care or aid 
within bureaucracies). This discouraged the kind of grain and livestock cultiva-
tion and sales the state needed to feed the population and meet its export needs. 
It also took away the distribution role of public institutions like stores. Finally, it 
created bitterness between urban and rural dwellers as urban dwellers bartered 
for food with peasants. 
Commerce was broken down and individualized. So, too, was produc-
tion-small friendship groups were organized to hire builders and build apart-
ments. Corruption and bribery became a part of even the smallest transactions.35 
Private industries proliferated. Some professionals began to learn handicrafts to 
supplement their incomes. This process was facilitated by government policy 
34 Rocznik Statystyczny 1984 (Warsaw: Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, 1984 ), p. 73. 
35 Interview data, 1983. 
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permitting small private crafts stores and the opening of production enterprises 
established by foreign entrepreneurs of Polish descent. 
The visible and politically explosive collapse in the domestic economy was 
not the only concrete sign of social breakdown and atomization before the dec-
laration of martial law. The crime rate rose dramatically from late spring 198 l 36 
on, as did the number of people who sought to emigrate from Poland to the 
West.37 Ironically, at the same time, family units became even stronger. The 
birth and marriage rate increased and the divorce rate fell even as the conditions 
in which families had to function worsened and health conditions deteriorated. 38 
Both Solidarity and the government and party acknowledged these problems 
and sought to solve them. But even the publicly acclaimed military inspections 
and arrests of profiteers in October-November 1981 did little to encourage legal 
observance or to create the impression that the government could govern. In-
stead, government offers of early retirement and long maternity leaves resulted 
in an exodus of virtually anyone who could survive with income cuts. Survival 
required people working together to barter, make, and trade for virtually all the 
necessities of life. 
By December 13, 1981, when martial law was imposed, domestic fragmen-
tation had reached a peak. Public opinion research done in the month prior to 
December 13 showed a dramatic increase in popular support for government 
control over demonstrations and strikes and also showed a drop in the authority 
of Solidarity.39 And yet, in the meetings of December 11 and 12, the National 
Coordinating Commission took its most explicitly oppositional steps, declaring 
that there had to be a national referendum on the party leadership and a move to 
end the dominance of the PUWP.40 Even more significantly, the distance be-
tween classes, within social groups, and between the government and the popu-
lation led to a total misperception by the population of the weakness of the gov-
ernment to act and by the regime leaders of the potential response of the popu-
lation. 
Martial Law Imposed 
In the period between October 1981 and midnight of December 13, there 
were continual discussions in the press about the possibility of a government 
declaration of a state of emergency through the constitutional channel of the 
parliament. Yet no preparations were made by the union organizations for an 
organized response to any declaration of martial law. Virtually none of the par-
ticipants meeting in the two conferences of Poland's leading semiloyal opposi-
tion groups (the Solidarity National Coordinating Commission and the Congress 
36 Rocznik Statystyczny 1984, p. 506. 
37 Ibid., p. 50. 
38 Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
39 See Adamski et al., Polacy, 1981. 
40 See Andrews, Poland 1980-1981 , pp. 253-55. 
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of Polish Culture) in session when martial law was declared sensed any danger. 
Neither took steps to avoid detention or prepare their members or the public. In 
fact, participants in the Solidarity National Coordinating Commission meeting 
in Gdansk and the Congress of Polish Culture left their relatively secure meeting 
places and returned to their homes or hotels on the night of December 12 even 
when some of them knew troop movements had begun and telephone lines had 
been cut. Eyewitness reports universally affirm that the customary unofficial 
gossip lines out of the party leadership had so broken down that, even after the 
detention of major figures and the takeover of Solidarity headquarters, few 
people in Warsaw or elsewhere knew what had happened until they started their 
normal lives on Sunday, December 13, and heard the declaration of "a state of 
war" on their radios or televisions, tried to use their phones, or found that 
friends and co-workers were gone. Both retrospectives and the continuation, 
until the last days before the state of war was declared, of negotiations and re-
buffs from Solidarity suggest that martial law was perceived by the decision 
makers as a final and unavoidable alternative to be taken when all else failed. 
Meeting notes of rulers from this period reveal both a real fear of the masses, if 
the economic situation deteriorated as they feared it would given the real short-
age of supplies, and, at the same time, a general secrecy at top levels about the 
martial law plan drawn up the preceding spring.41 Yet, the extent of the deten-
tion and placement of military and police units and the direct involvement of 
Jaruzelski in directing its imposition (and his later insistence that this was or-
dered by the Soviet Union) as well as the presence of Soviet officials, suggest 
that the regime saw no other option except a Soviet intervention and that it ex-
pected a far more extensive and organized opposition than it saw in the hours, 
days, and weeks after martial law was declared. 
The nature of martial law reinforced the divisions that preceded its decla-
ration. Massive numbers of police and military units were visibly stationed in 
urban and rural areas without permission to have personal contacts with the citi-
zens. The initial provisions of the state of war declaration, beyond providing for 
the suspension of all organizations and the right to strike, were targeted primar-
ily at breaking down all communication channels. Travel was blocked. A strict 
curfew was imposed. All media but the military and party journals and radio and 
television broadcasts of the military were closed down. Telephone lines were cut 
and mail to the outside strictly censored. The right to hold any public gatherings 
except church services was suspended. Furthermore, after an initial period of 
chaos, there was differential treatment of workers and intellectuals in the in-
ternment camps. This encouraged a division between the two groups. 
We have no way of knowing, beyond the justifications given by the martial 
law authorities, what the precise preparations for martial law had been. It ap-
pears, given the Communist leaders' memoirs, the internment lists released to 
the Red Cross, and the revelations by Colonel Kuklinski, that the lists were 
41 See Rakowski, Jak to sie stalo?, chapter I. Wojciech Jaruzelski in his justification 
points to this social disorder and the readiness of the Soviets to invade. 
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made up in the spring of 1981.42 At the same time, the number of individuals 
involved in martial law planning was small enough to prevent any leakage. 
The final decision to impose martial law is said to have been a civilian one, 
not a military decision, except in the sense that Jaruzelski "wore both hats." It 
was also not intended to strengthen either the position or power of the Commu-
nist Party. The party was not included as a signatory in any of the initial decla-
rations. Only in later propaganda were party units said to have called for martial 
law. The reaction to martial law was a massive defection from the party at all 
levels that began as soon as workplaces reopened.43 
Social Actors 
In the initial months after martial law was declared, power was in the 
hands of the military and the police. Instead of giving an ideological reason for 
the martial law decision or promising improved conditions, the leaders made it 
clear that this had been a last resort to protect the nation's sovereignty and to 
avoid collapse and Soviet intervention. Those who might oppose martial law or 
who were seen as potential sparks for discontent ( even former delegates to the 
Extraordinary Party Congress) were interned or threatened with detention. 
Whatever the ultimate level of repression, the presence of martial law rule was 
very visible, with police, ZOMO (special armed riot police), and military troops 
on the streets. 
The imposition of martial law broke down the Solidarity organization. The 
top leadership was interned and isolated. A second-level self-appointed leader-
ship had to take over. With no telephone lines open and travel restricted, and 
with the continuing threat of internments and the sealing of buildings, most of 
Solidarity's communication equipment and records were gone and the organiza-
tional bases for any resistance with publicly articulated goals were blocked. The 
economic conditions, the lack of preparation on how to handle such an exi-
gency, and the destruction of both formal and informal channels of communica-
tion broke Solidarity down further, making it look far less effective. Whatever 
the individual opposition to government actions, Solidarity, as an organization, 
temporarily lost its resources, its momentum, and its leadership.44 
True, on anniversaries symbolic in Solidarity's or Poland's history, in-
creasingly younger demonstrators took to the streets in what became violent 
42 Colonel Kuklinski was a former head of the Strategic Planning Department of the 
Polish General Staff who defected in early 1981 . The Polish leaders knew of his defec-
tion and assumed this meant American leaders were apprised of the martial law plan. His 
revelations reported in Kultura (Paris), no. 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 3-57 were that mar-
tial law was prepared in the spring of 1981 as a final measure. Jaruzelski and others have 
since testified to this and to the Soviet pressure as the final push. 
43 See Sulek, "The Polish United Worker's Party." 
44 Jerzy Holzer, So/idarnosc Poddziemmie (Lodz: Wydawnicwo Lodzkie, 1990), 
chapter I . 
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clashes with police and ZOMO. These conflicts were all violent, and the 
"victory" of Solidarity was limited to its symbolic ability to call out demonstra-
tors in the face of all odds.45 They kept alive the image of struggle between "the 
people" and the regime. But they did not build or rebuild the union organization; 
Solidarity's network survived in the reemergence of an underground press, in 
the resources of life in hiding, and in the conditions of the detention camps. 
Post-martial law demonstrations were a return to methods prevalent in earlier 
years, when workers took to the streets in uncontrolled protest with no organ-
ized leadership. This shift from what had been a successful strategy to what had 
never proved successful, and from adult participants with established grievances 
to ever-younger groups, was due to the practical problems the movement faced. 
Workers in economically perilous positions could not risk having a role in a 
strike and being arrested or fired when they had little hope that the demonstra-
tions could succeed. The shift from workers to young people was a result of this 
hope, that something would change. Adults, then, opted out. For high school and 
college students, though, there were simply fewer risks and less of a sense of the 
permanency of the state. 
The one institution that gained from the breakdown was the Catholic 
Church. Parish-level priests were active in supporting popular demands. The 
Church, on this level, became a symbol for popular political action, while 
the Church hierarchy made itself less of a visible presence in opposition to the 
state. The Church hierarchy pressed for calm and compromise rather than com-
petition and conflict. Its initial power to do even this was further diminished by 
the illness and death in June 1981 of the postwar head of the Church, Cardinal 
Stefan Wyszynski. 
In this whole breakdown period, Church officials were mediators and 
conegotiators with representatives of the party-state and Solidarity. After the 
declaration of martial law, the Church was involved, on the one hand, in aiding 
internees and arguing against martial law and, on the other, in pressing for do-
mestic calm and bargaining for increasing rights for itself.46 
In this setting, intellectuals shifted their foci . Before martial law, many 
leading intellectuals and intellectual groupings were focused on advocating their 
own specific interests: passing the censorship law, drawing up new professional 
codes and protections, pressing for increased benefits for their groups, establish-
ing a new law on higher education, and organizing the Congress of Polish Cul-
ture to review the needs of Polish intellectual life. Many were concerned with 
broader political advocacy as well: there was an increase in the percentage of 
university professors and journalists in government positions. Many more made 
active commitments to Solidarity. Large numbers of discussion groups sprang 
45 Marek Perna), Jan Skarzynski, Kalendarium Solidarnosci 1980-89 (Warsaw: Omni-
press, 1990); and Jerzy Holzer, So/idarnosc Poddziemmie (Lodz: Wydawnicwo Lodzkie, 
1990). 
46 See Piotr Nitecki, Czlowiek droga kosciola (Warsaw: Osrodek Dokumentacji i Stu-
diow Spolecznych, 1987). 
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up to deal not only with Poland's problems but also with how to resolve them. 
Some, such as the former dissident leaders from KOR and the Confederation for 
an Independent Poland (KPN), pushed for radical change. Others put themselves 
forward as negotiators. Still others sought to propose programs of limited re-
form. This involved many leading intellectuals in at least coffeehouse searches 
for solutions and in public protests over government failures and abuses. It took 
many away from focusing on purely professional work. 
The declaration of martial law split the intellectuals. For many leading in-
tellectuals in the party, martial law was evidence of its total bankruptcy. Many 
previously prominent party members resigned or simply became inactive. This, 
while not made a public issue, was widely known and contributed to an image 
of an isolated leadership. On the other hand, some few moved up in the gov-
ernment. The bulk either left all their public positions in protest or turned to 
"private politics" and the underground.47 
The Economy 
Ultimately, the imposition of martial law furthered the collapse of the 
economy. The old "coping mechanisms" no longer worked. Initial restrictions 
on travel within Poland made the barter trade that had kept life survivable more 
complicated. The economic ramifications of Western sanctions reduced Po-
land ' s ability to import goods. The end to Western government-to-government 
aid triggered a shift to churches as material providers. This further scrambled 
the roles of traditional institutions and allowed the Church to attract people, not 
as a spiritual or political guide but as a source of basic material goods. 
,The potential for economic reform was diminished by the size of the debt 
and the political ramifications which were likely to accompany decentralization 
and increased individual initiative and accountability. The various reform pro-
posals also struck out against the power and interests of the bureaucracy and 
managerial class and were bound to lead to a dramatic reduction in their size. So 
government and party bureaucrats and members of the managerial class were a 
strong counterforce to reforms. They stressed, before and after martial law, that 
the errors of the Gierek regime and the subsequent sanctions were the cause of 
Poland's economic disaster. 
Foreign Actors 
During 1981, action on the Polish debt was limited by the worldwide re-
cession, and by (1) Westerners ' perception that the Soviet economy would not 
allow Poland to default, and (2) their fear that, if Poland were excused, other 
debtor nations would be encouraged not to make their loan payments. So West-
ern actions focused, first, on making it clear to Poles that their failure to meet 
47 Interview data, 1983. 
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the debt service would cut them off from future aid and loans and, second, on 
drawing up a detailed series of required economic reforms (including the drastic 
food price increases) the Poles had to agree to put into effect to avoid default-
although they were not permitted to refer to the agreement as the cause for their 
decisions.48 
In essence, by 1981 , Western actors were involved with their own prob-
lems. They no longer worked with Polish leaders or considered Polish condi-
tions. Instead, they dictated internal Polish decisions based on their international 
financial considerations. Furthermore, since, in this period, the changes in Brit-
ish, French, West German, and American leaderships had left these regimes in a 
state of internal restructuring, the foreign policy apparatus essentially did not 
focus on Polish political developments to the extent that economic institutions 
focused on the debt situation. The conservative victories in Britain, West Ger-
many, and the United States marked a swing away from detente and toward con-
frontation with the Soviet Union. So the message conveyed to many sections of 
the Polish foreign policy apparatus was that financial interests were the West's 
chief concern, even as the foreign policy of Western states seemed to shift to 
confrontation with the Soviet Union. The possibility for further loans, clearly, 
was negligible. 
By fall of 1981 , the Polish government had tried all avenues. It made ap-
plication to the International Monetary Fund, and counted on this aid politically 
as well as economically. Poland's admission would have given Western special-
ists enormous control over the redirecting of the Polish economy. In spite of 
these ramifications, the Soviets had agreed to this "out" for Poland. Final 
American agreement and the final acceptance of the Polish burden, though, were 
too slow to put IMF aid in place by the end of 1981. The declaration of martial 
law made it politically untenable for the West to allow IMF involvement to 
continue. 
The breakdown of the Polish regime's ability to block foreign intervention 
and, in fact, its need for external force were even greater in the case of the So-
viet Union. The continuing maneuvers of Warsaw Pact troops on Poland's bor-
ders drew in Poland's own troops, testing their battle readiness and political 
attitudes. Ultimately, most significantly, the Soviets used economic pressures to 
direct events in Poland. They were silent partners in negotiations about further 
loans and the debt question by Western bankers. They and the East Europeans 
cut back on their financial aid to Poland as liberalization swept Poland. And, 
according to some, the Soviets advised the Poles that if, by January 1, 1982, the 
government did not have its domestic affairs under control, a large percentage 
of goods and energy shipments to Poland from the Soviet Union would be 
ended.49 
48 Interview data, 1980 and 1981 , with bankers and government officials involved. 
49 Interview data, 1983. 
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Foreign Response to Martial Law 
The declaration of martial law was a response, then, not only to the party 
and government's loss of control over the domestic situation but also to foreign 
economic incursions. At the same time, its timing-two days before December 
15 when Western debt service payments were due, and two weeks before the 
rumored Soviet deadline to cut off oil and natural gas if there was no restoration 
of order-was clearly a response to the West and not just to the Soviet orders. 
The presence of Soviet General Kulikov the week before martial law was de-
clared was certainly not incidental. His role was, at the least, that of telling the 
Poles that they had to act and of supervising their actions. The absence of Soviet 
and East European troop movements at this point and his lack of expertise in 
domestic battles suggest that a direction from the Soviets for martial law itself or 
an actual Soviet troop commitment was not considered to be necessary to calm 
the Polish crisis. Finally, although martial law was not politically or economi-
cally anti-Western-in fact, there was no mention of any foreign powers in the 
martial law declaration-cutting off Poles' contacts with outside support was a 
key element in establishing control of the country. 
The declaration of a state of war did not reduce foreign pressure on Po-
land. It brought sanctions from the West and minimal rewards from Soviet Bloc 
allies. The immediate impact of the sanctions was diminished by the fact that 
Poland had been too strapped to import most of the goods barred from shipment 
after martial law was imposed.50 Divisions between Western Europe and the 
United States over the broader issue of their treatment of the Soviet Union, as 
well as the massive private charity missions that were initiated in the winter of 
1981, further diminished the real impact of the sanctions. The Polish leadership 
used Western sanctions as a justification for the economic crisis while many 
Poles saw the sanctions and private charity missions as signs of Western oppo-
sition to martial law. Ironically, the sanctions served to aid the Polish economy 
by giving Poland an excuse not to pay its debt to Western governments. This, 
then, allowed Poland to meet its minimal obligations to private banks and have 
some limited hard currency available.51 
Similarly, Soviet and East European aid was of minimal help. It could 
neither fill the needs of individuals nor substitute for the Western parts and raw 
materials on which Polish industry was dependent. And, like the propaganda 
created about Western sanctions, propaganda about Soviet fraternal aid was 
heard very differently. Most Poles assumed the aid was insufficient and a sign of 
Soviet control over purportedly "Polish" decisions. No real shift from a Western 
to an Eastern orientation in the economy occurred. As a result, Polish industry 
50 See Eric Bourne, "For Poles, Easing US Sanctions Means Little More Than Her-
ring," in Christian Science Monitor 75 (Nov. 4, 1983), p. 9. 
51 See Nicholas Andrews, "Poland's Need to Regain Credibility as a Global Borrower" 
in Christian Science Monitor 79 (March 19, 1987), p. 15. 
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was, to a greater or lesser degree, frozen and forced to depend on what it could 
produce. 
Reequilibration 
A pattern of equilibrium emerged in Poland by the fall of 1982, nearly one year 
after the imposition of the state of war. It was based neither on "honeymoon" 
support of the new leadership nor on its promises of a better life and more re-
spect for the population but on social divisions and economic failures and the 
fact that the population simply had no hope that its lot would improve. Three 
events signaled the end of the breakdown in power and social control by the 
governing institutions and the return of at least an uneasy equilibrium: the com-
paratively peaceful disbanding of Solidarity and the imposition of a new, limited 
trade union organization; the failure of the "one-day strike" called by the under-
ground leadership of Solidarity for November 12; and the release of Solidarity 
leader Lech Walesa from internment as a "private citizen." These events dem-
onstrated that, with or without support, government authorities were able to ex-
ert their power. 
The critical structural move in this period was the initial suspension of 
martial law as an indication of"normalization." This was followed by the lifting 
of some of the more visible controls and a continuation or increase in more legal 
restrictions imposed under martial law. The focus of the regime was on demon-
strating two things: (1) whether or not it was popular, permanent control had 
been achieved, and (2) its claim that, even with martial law, it was on the 
"Solidarity road." This was reinforced symbolically by the government' s atten-
tion to the return of the Pope to Poland in the summer of 1983, the observation 
of the founding date of Solidarity as a public event, and the lifting of martial law 
in July 1983, with the accompanying changes in legal provisions for control 
over various areas, as well as amnesty for underground Solidarity activists. 
In symbol and reality, the regime used nationalism. It did this to the point 
of resurrecting previously forbidden anti-Russian and anti-regime symbols. Po-
land's foreign relations furthered this nationalist focus. Even though Poland had 
fulfilled the letter, if not the spirit, of the requirements for the lifting of Western 
sanctions, they were not lifted. Nor were Western states as prepared as they had 
been in earlier crises to accept refugees. Therefore, many former internees who 
had been told by the Polish authorities that they could leave Poland had their 
exits delayed by difficulties in getting visas from Western states. At the same 
time, charitable aid shipments fell as Poland disappeared from the news. To 
further the sense of isolation and separation between Western states and Poles, 
the Polish government made formerly easy contact between Western officials 
and Poles difficult by stationing police troops around key embassies and engag-
ing in bitter media statements against the West. Soviet and Soviet Bloc contacts 
with Poland also did not increase visibly during this period. It was not until the 
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winter of 1984 that the travel restrictions between Poland and her neighbors, 
established first by East Gennany and Czechoslovakia in the initial days of 
Solidarity, were relaxed. 
Public expressions of political or military concerns about the situation in 
Poland by either the West or East ceased to be either frequent or severe. For the 
official Western side, Poland was a status quo situation. For the Soviet side, the 
death of Brezhnev and his replacement by Andropov led to a focusing of Soviet 
concerns on domestic regulation. World attention refocused on the potential of a 
direct superpower conflict. In this context, the changes that did occur in Poland 
were not ofreal concern to either Poland's allies or her self-appointed adversar-
ies. 
The Economy 
In this reequilibration period, price adjustments were the chief economic 
mechanism used to improve the domestic economy. Individual factories were 
allowed to set their own prices. 52 Purchase prices for fanners were increased and 
compensated for by decreased subsidies on the food sold on the market. In the 
process of economic reequilibration, prices went up but goods began to appear 
on the market in large enough quantities to allow rationing to be dropped month 
by month. This too was used as an indication of the nonnalization of the eco-
nomic situation and the ability of the government to bring some benefits to the 
population. All of this served as a substitute for real economic refonn. 
In this period, economic refonn discussion took on a tone of reality. Under 
martial law, nearly 30 percent of Polish industries had been militarized, so no 
refonn measures (such as self-management) could be implemented.53 With the 
suspension of martial law, not only did the discussion of refonn packages go on 
actively in the press and in various commissions of specialists set up to aid the 
government; but, the refonns that had been passed prior to the imposition of 
martial law and those that were before the Sejm when it was imposed were put 
into effect. So, while all of them were watered-down versions of the initial pro-
posals, anyone involved in the economy had to come to grips with what they 
could lose and gain from each aspect of a decentralizing refonn. 
Political Groups 
Politically, the banning of Solidarity in October 1982 was a final shakeout 
of party membership. With the ending of any hope that "nonnalization" would 
mean a return to the 1980-81 status quo, there was a final large defection from 
the party. In addition, the leadership of the Jaruzelski government and party 
52 See Zbigniew M. Fallenbuch1, "The Polish Economy under Martial Law," Soviet 
Studies 36 (1984), pp. 513-27. 
53 Interview data, 1983. 
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underwent its last ideological "cleansing."54 Subsequent changes in leaders dur-
ing the period of reequilibration were merely cosmetic. Neither the liberal nor 
the conservative groupings gained within the party elite. At best, the suspension 
of martial law brought with it an increase in the number of military officials 
charged with civilian responsibilities. But, as had been the case since the decla-
ration of martial law, the party leadership remained relatively silent. 
The period between the outlawing of Solidarity and the lifting of martial 
law was marked by a legislation of legitimacy and control. New laws were 
passed authorizing greater police powers and rights than had been ever been 
admitted before. Greater labor regulation than had been the case in the 1960s 
and 1970s went along with this. Furthermore, the penal code was modified to 
give far greater rights to military courts over civilian cases and to allow for the 
arrests of individuals acting as the original founders of Solidarity had acted. 
Finally, laws were passed against alcoholism and social parasitism, as well as 
for stronger military authority. These were all intended to give the government 
direct and indirect ways not only to handle existing social problems but also to 
control individuals who defied the authorities. Balancing these laws, there was a 
plethora of legislation giving limited social welfare benefits, such as lengthened 
maternity leaves; enacting parts of the economic reform legislation sought by 
various groups; and giving amnesty to Solidarity activists willing to come for-
ward and admit fault by accepting it. In addition, laws were passed giving legal 
status to an enlarged sphere of private enterprise.55 Governmental actions also 
allowed for a greater role for the Church in the mass media, the education of 
children, and the making of social policy than had ever existed legally in the 
postwar period. 
The statements of party and government officials in this period of reequili-
bration emphasized both the authorities' commitment to social betterment and 
their ability to rule and control without any support. The postsuspension period 
also was filled with retrospective books and articles explaining that martial law 
had been the best of the unsatisfactory options available to the government and 
stressing that the alternative had been a bloody and unwelcome Soviet invasion. 
As their ideological heritage, party and government leaders claimed the Ex-
traordinary Party Congress and the "partnership" they had supported throughout 
1980 and 1981. To keep up this image, the government continued to pay those 
who had been on the Solidarity payroll until its disbanding and offered elaborate 
financial settlements to many in the intelligentsia fired for being ideologically 
unacceptable. 
Ironically, as a part of their attempt to give themselves legitimacy, the top 
Jaruzelski leaders recruited, as ministers and aides, prominent liberal academics 
54 Sulek, "The Polish United Worker's Party"; and Lewis, Political Authority and 
Party Secretaries. 
55 The prime vehicle for this was to facilitate investments by Poles living abroad, as 
joint ventures with foreigners were allowed by the new law only with foreigners of Pol-
ish background. 
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and journalists who had had legitimacy in the 1970s because of their critical 
perspectives. This legitimation did not carry over into their positions in the mar-
tial law regime. Old social ties were severed. But the criticism from their col-
leagues who refused to join the regime created, among those who joined the 
Jaruzelski group, a bitter sense of betrayal and misrepresentation.56 Hence, Soli-
darity, the previously suppressed historical events, and martial law could never 
be put to rest by the ruling elite, much less Solidarity' s old leaders. 
The legislative and ideological posture of the Jaruzelski leadership, how-
ever much it was rejected by the population, demanded a new set of responses 
from the underground Solidarity leadership. Their initial program of keeping up 
popular pressure for the reinstatement of Solidarity with regular demonstrations 
on various Solidarity anniversaries had to end when the government disbanded 
Solidarity and released Lech Walesa. His release as a private citizen and his at 
least oblique suggestions that compromise was possible put the more radical 
leaders, imprisoned or in the underground, in a quandary. It divided Solidarity's 
image. 
In initially reacting to the disbanding of Solidarity (prior to Lech Walesa's 
release), the underground leadership had not supported a spontaneous three-day 
strike by Gdansk shipyard workers. Instead, they had tried to organize an unan-
nounced national strike one month later. This strike failed to draw support be-
cause the union had to make its plans public, thus giving the authorities enough 
warning to frighten people away. Its failure was then used as a signal by the 
regime that Solidarity was "no longer a threat." 
In this new context, Solidarity underground leaders, its former leaders who 
Jived "above ground," and intellectual critics and dissidents had to rethink their 
long-run perspectives and tactics. This rethinking led to diverse expressions of 
opinion reflecting the need of the organization both (I) to appear concerned 
with members' "union" interests (some suggested that Solidarity members join 
existing workers' self-management groups to push for benefits) and (2) to force 
recognition and change in the political establishment. To do this, some put out a 
call for a boycott of the new unions, for strikes and street demonstrations, and 
for continued active opposition. 
This period was marked by a diminution of the authority of the Catholic 
Church. From the beginning of this reequilibration period, the Church hierarchy, 
especially its new Primate, Josef Glemp, called for restraint on the part of Soli-
darity and, in exchange, sought concessions from the government on the con-
struction of churches, provision of religious education, Church access to the 
mass media, and a summer visit by the Pope. The coincidence of these first calls 
for restraint with the announcement of Solidarity ' s disbanding, the release of an 
apparently circumspect Lech Walesa, and the announcement that the Pope 
would visit Poland in the summer raised questions at the time as to how much 
the Church was willing to fight for national political democracy or freedom. 
56 Interview data, 1983. 
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The Church's leadership was further divided. Josef Glemp was relatively 
young, unestablished, and noncharismatic in comparison to Wyszynski, who 
had headed the Church since the war. Furthermore, he faced competition from 
Pope John Paul II (who made himself a visible observer and actor in Polish af-
fairs and was regarded by the nation as "their leader") and other bishops whose 
public lives in the Church had been far longer and more militant than Glemp 's. 
Therefore, even as head of the Church, Glemp had limited authority. Beyond 
this, the hierarchy faced the disaffection of the lower rungs of the clergy. Parish 
priests were heavily involved in distributing charitable aid to their parishioners. 
Many also were involved with aiding and hiding the remnants of Solidarity in 
their own communities. This went on even as the leaders of the Church sidled 
closer to the governing elite. 
Finally, the Catholic intelligentsia, from the pre-Solidarity and post-
Solidarity eras, remained, as individuals, closely involved with Solidarity. In 
this period of equilibrium, their clubs and publications were often the only ha-
ven for intellectuals fired from their jobs. They wanted to push for liberalization 
but were cautious enough to insure the safety of their last remaining islands of 
employment and discussion.57 
For each of these groups and for the believers and nonbelievers alike in 
Poland, the visit of the Pope was a critical and unpredictable political juncture. 
Expectations were high that he would defy the authorities and force them to 
make major concessions. In fact, his appearance in Poland was a victory for the 
Church and the government. With the exception of limited conflicts that broke 
out in Warsaw and Cracow, his stay was peaceful. Government estimates are 
that nearly one-third of the population attended one of his appearances and 
heard his nationalistic, family-oriented sermons. The government treated him as 
an honored guest and publicized the high-level meetings that took place between 
him and Jaruzelski. The Pope left Poland having gotten no visible concessions 
and with the announcement of potential Church agricultural aid delayed until 
well after his departure, only to be bogged down in the complexities of legal 
requirements and financial complications. In the lifting of martial law, the 
Pope's visit seemed to give an aura of legitimacy to the regime. From the 
Church's perspective, however, the gains were fundamental to its own goals of 
getting more access to the population, making abortion more difficult, and in-
creasing the number of churches. Public opinion continued to perceive disunity 
in the Church hierarchy below the Pope. After the Pope's visit, Church protests 
about laws were largely ignored rather than responded to. And, Church leaders 
increasingly pressed to rein in critical clergy. All of this reduced the Church's 
image as a firm base for limiting the regime. What saved the Church was the 
dearth of other options to oppose the system, even symbolically. 
The reequilibration period was thus based on the final failure of all alter-
native institutions and the remaining presence of the government and the party. 
It began with an established base of opposition in Solidarity and ended with the 
57 Interview data, 1983. 
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legitimation of some of Solidarity's principles (both by law and in public opin-
ion) by the regime and the growth of an explicitly tolerated culture of "internal 
immigration." 
The attempted integration took place on all levels. The rulers' attempts to 
forge new links with intellectuals, however, were largely stymied by the unwill-
ingness of many to be co-opted. Consultive councils and invitations to talk with 
party and state officials publicly or privately were most often rejected out of 
hand. Workers were more easily reinvolved during this period. Their channels 
of involvement were the new factory union and self-management organizations 
begun with the suspension of martial law. Internal party reports show that, in 
small and medium-sized units, even when the first initiatives came from the 
regional party, Solidarity members often took the lead and dominated party 
members in the councils. Although only an average of 40 percent of the em-
ployees in a given enterprise enrolled as members, this was presented by the 
government as evidence of support and by Solidarity as evidence of continued 
opposition. 
What Doomed Communism in Poland 
Poland's reequilibration in 1983 was not permanent; nor did anyone on either 
side see it as such. The breakdown was simply too deep; the past had manacled 
the system's ability to respond and caused virtually total fragmentation in the 
economy and the society. At the same time, a massive and externally imposed 
crushing of rebellions, such as ended the 1956 revolt in Hungary and the Prague 
Spring in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, was not an option for Poland in 1981. It was 
unthinkable because of the increased complexity of the international situation 
and Poland's position in it, as well as the thoroughness of the economy's col-
lapse and the population's alienation. 
Ironically, the apparent stability of the reequilibration period depended on 
the loss of authority by all institutions in the society. No institution (including 
the Church, Solidarity, the military, and the state apparatus) came through un-
scathed. Western sanctions and the countervailing interest of the Soviet Union 
and the other bloc members had isolated Poland from real external economic or 
political influence at the moment when an equilibrium seemed to have been 
achieved. In the end, the system was simply poised for another crisis-any 
change from outside or inside could destabilize it. 
External Forces 
As with Poland's other postwar crises, the institutions and processes 
around which a loyal and disloyal opposition organized in 1980 were institu-
tions and processes forced on Poland after the Communist takeover and main-
tained by Soviet requirements. The requirements (the so-called Brezhnev Doc-
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trine) were taken into account, at least subconsciously, by all but the most radi-
cal opposition elements in their formulation of demands and responses during 
1980-81 .58 At the same time, the extent of domestic Polish democratization and 
discussion tolerated by the Soviets in the 1980s proved to be far greater than had 
ever even been assumed before. The level of this tolerance emboldened the 
movement and left the state and party leadership exposed. Even the declaration 
of martial law and the regime's justification of it violated basic maxims of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine: it suggested, if it did not admit, that the Soviet Union was 
not a friend but a controller and that control, not Marxist-Leninist purity, was 
the goal. In part, this was a result of the special treatment accorded Poles by the 
Soviet Union in the past, but it also reflected the growing crisis in the Soviet 
Union. In the end, then, even before Gorbachev, the Soviet threat had dimin-
ished for Poles. 
The development of the events in Poland was, however, not just a product 
of the Soviet Union. It was far more a product of the increased complexity of 
intrabloc relations. Poland was not simply beholden to or dependent on the So-
viet Union. Rather, it was as economically dependent on the West as it was on 
the East. In tum, its connection with the West enabled other bloc nations to re-
ceive the trade and technological infusions they needed to improve their 
economies. Therefore, none of the major forces in the bloc could afford the cost 
of Poland's breaking her trade ties with the West, nor could they provide the 
parts and materials that Poland's heavily Westernized economy needed to con-
tinue production. All of this contributed to at least partial support by other bloc 
states for Poland's ties with the West, even though they were threatened by her 
internal liberalization and chaos. 
Western economic commitment to Poland and the linkage between eco-
nomic ties and human rights observance diminished as private creditors sought 
to protect their investments and Western governments to deal with their own 
domestic problems. This encouraged other leaders in the Soviet Bloc to openly 
pressure the Poles. Potential Western responses, however, remained important 
enough in the economic and political considerations of the Brezhnev elite to 
keep them from publicly suppressing Solidarity. In addition, the extent of Po-
land's indebtedness and the cost of replacing Western input in the Polish econ-
omy (to say nothing of the threat of lending limits being applied to the entire 
bloc) increased the propensity of the Soviets and their allies to be tolerant and 
avoid military commitments that would jeopardize Soviet detente with Western 
Europe and require Soviet troops to fight on two fronts, Afghanistan and Po-
land. 
In an ironic sense, the economic involvement of Poland with the West (as 
well as its historic identity with things Western) increased the number of deci-
sions based on external actors ' interests. Poland's strategic position in the Soviet 
bloc also reduced the potential options for averting crisis and breakdown. The 
58 Jadwiga Staniszkis, Poland 's Self-limiting Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1984) deals with this conscious limitation. 
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outcome of the reequilibration was not a further integration of Poland with any 
bloc (as occurred in Hungary and Czechoslovakia when their revolutions were 
put down by the Soviets) but an isolation of the economy and polity from the 
outside. So, within the constraints of minimum Soviet and Western tolerance, 
Poland was left, in the end, to find its own solutions. In that situation, the old 
Communist elite could not hold on by itself. 
Economic Pressures 
The extent of Poland's economic involvement and indebtedness to the 
West buoyed the economy enough, until the last years of the 1970s, to allow it 
to avoid any structural change and hampered future attempts at change with the 
overwhelming weight of debt repayment. Workers were encouraged by prom-
ises of material reward. Economic misinvestment, inefficiency, and failure were 
managed by borrowing to substitute for increased production. Furthermore, as 
Polish agricultural products became the only viable currency for paying Po-
land's debts, the reward of more and better food was removed just as popular 
expectations were raised by Gierek's promises of a better future and higher in-
come. 
At the same time, the dependence of the economy on agricultural products 
and the low legitimacy that the state historically had with the peasant class made 
agricultural reform impossible. The delay in reforming agriculture and the de-
pendence of the system on outside trade simply encouraged the aging of the 
agricultural population while it stiffened the peasants' historic resistance to re-
form. 
Poland's economic involvement with the West and the West's long-
standing tolerance of Poland's failing economic institutions and practices, 
permitting them to survive and to be entrenched, made it almost impossible for 
Poland to avoid economic collapse without getting massive aid from the outside. 
As it happened, recession in the West and tensions between the Soviet Union 
and the United States ruled out such a result. Economic failure thus made crisis 
and breakdown of authority in Poland virtually inevitable. Moreover, the disas-
trous state of Poland's internal economy and the overwhelming burden ofrepay-
ing its debt made the peaceful and apolitical institutionalization of Solidarity 
impossible as well. There were simply no material demands that could be met, 
given the economic crisis in 1980. Instead, initially, political demands were the 
only and "cheapest" concessions there were to grant. These concessions did not 
substitute for economic gains. They merely increased the population's sense that 
no political gain had any meaning and that there was no possible peaceful solu-
tion. 
The economic crisis and collapse in the late summer and fall of 1981 were 
so deep that the short-term sacrifices required to reform the socialist economy 
and ward off future collapse and failure could not be made. In a reversal of 
traditional political patterns, the failure of the economy contributed first to the 
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bitter gulf between the elite and the population; then, to a widening of that gulf; 
and, finally, to a false calming of the bitterness. In effect, the impoverishment of 
the entire system and the extent to which survival became a preoccupation de-
politicized the issue temporarily by making political action too risky, costly, and 
time-consuming. An economy in which nothing was available made under-
ground Solidarity less able to call for public action. No one could risk what had 
been gained. Finally, the depths of the economic failure meant that any im-
provement, be it charity shipments or increased domestic production, contrib-
uted to the appearance of a survivable equilibrium. But it also made it nearly 
impossible for Poland to enact a reform package that would allow for change 
without a total transformation in the system and a temporary and intolerable 
impoverishment of the population. 
Establishing Elite Options 
The possibility of bringing in a new elite unconnected with the discredited 
Gierek regime and tolerable to the population and the Soviet Union did not exist 
by I 980. The fact that the Communist system had lasted for more than a gen-
eration and involved party control over appointments even to apolitical mana-
gerial posts left Poland with a very limited (and compromised) base for selecting 
new leaders. The "reforms" undertaken by the Gierek leadership shrank this 
base even further. On the one hand, all alternatives within the Communist party 
had been pushed out or denied media access by 1980. Regional reform in the 
1970s had reduced the autonomy of regional leaders, a traditional source for 
new leadership. Furthermore, bureaucratization in the party had increased dra-
matically in the 1970s and left party politicians and personalities with very little 
visibility. On the other hand, the tight control Gierek kept over the media caused 
many of the alternative leaders outside the party, who were critical of the regime 
and its policies, to disappear from the public mind. 
The Party 
Workers made it clear in their initial strikes that the party was no longer a 
negotiating partner they would recognize, as they had in past confrontations. 
The appointment of Stanislaw Kania to replace Edward Gierek was treated as 
basically irrelevant. The party ranked below even the police on public surveys 
of respected institutions. All of this left the party elite with an ever-declining 
membership and no constituency but the bureaucracy, a group whose interest 
was in blocking political concessions. 
The remnants of the Gierek elite tried a minimalist approach to survival 
after the original strikes. It merely shifted power from Gierek to Kania, a little-
known party bureaucrat who had supervised the police and religious affairs for 
the PUWP. Gradually, however, the party leadership sought to create public 
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support by bringing in leaders whose identities and credibility were based on 
their connections with institutions that still had authority in the society (the 
military, academics, and journalism). The problem with this shift was that these 
outsiders (often former "establishment" critics of the regime) were unable to 
control either the party or the state bureaucracy that was supposed to serve 
them. Nor, in fact, did their prestige and authority follow them to their new po-
sitions. The only effect of this shift was to reduce popular perceptions of the 
party as a focus of power and to discourage individuals from seeing party mem-
bership as a route up. 
Given that it was not possible to find individuals to lead the party who 
could control the bureaucracy and increase its authority, the party and its leaders 
were faced with a series of problematic program options. They tried first to fol-
low popular pressure, allow authority to shift to state organs, and have the party 
take a secondary position. All this alarmed the party apparatus and made them 
less trusting of the "outsiders" who had been promoted over them into leader-
ship positions. As a result, the public saw the party not as accepting a new role 
but as collapsing into internal warfare.59 The second option, tried sporadically 
during the Solidarity period, was for the party leadership to allow party struc-
tures to liberalize. This both alarmed Poland's allies and led to grassroots chal-
lenges from both ends of the ideological spectrum. Finally, party leaders in-
creasingly cloaked themselves in state and military garb and presented them-
selves to a distrusting population as an anti-Soviet force that had saved the 
country from its allies. This forced the party to focus on symbols that had long 
been used by the opposition. 
None of these tactics worked to either transform the elite or bring it real 
support. The individuals who made and presented policy were not "new" or 
untainted; they got no "honeymoon." In addition, the appearance of Solidarity 
did not lead to a "cleansing of the leadership." Instead, it led to a fragmentation 
of the party leadership. This was so visible that it further decreased the credibil-
ity of any single individual and left the party as a whole with no ability to make 
and carry out policies. What one. group said, others often ignored. The popula-
tion either saw this as an internal division or perceived the elite as deliberately 
going back on its word. 
The party leadership refused to make a dramatic break with the past, dis-
band the party and open a new one, or enact dramatic reform, even though many 
of their own advisors counseled that this would be the only hope for a peaceful 
resolution of the crisis and the only way to rebuild the party ' s authority. The 
first element they recommended was to enact new and immediate steps toward 
economic reform and political decentralization, but this would have required 
resources that the economy did not possess, and it threatened the party bureauc-
racy. The second stage would have been to dissolve the party along with all the 
other social organizations and begin a new party. This would have required that 
there be enough support for the ideals the party represented or enough possible 
59 Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej (CBOS) Surveys, 1985. 
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advantages to membership for people to be willing to join the new party. Given 
how many people had withdrawn from party membership, this option clearly 
carried the risk of a memberless Communist Party replacing the demoralized but 
immutable numbers of the old party. It was a risk that Jaruzelski and other top 
party leaders were unwilling to take. Ultimately, the party political, as opposed 
to bureaucratic, leadership shifted power away from itself without either rebuild-
ing or permitting other institutions to gamer true authority. This meant there was 
no real break with the past in the public mind while every institution lost power 
and legitimacy. 
The State Institutions 
State institutions were constrained as well. The ministries, economic bu-
reaucracy, and parliament were all peopled by Gierek' s men. Their choices, as 
Solidarity became more powerful, were to visibly renounce their pasts or con-
tinue in the old ways and try to protect their power base. Effectively, large num-
bers of parliamentary delegates, before the imposition of martial law and to a 
lesser degree afterwards, took the option of renouncing their previous connec-
tions. Political and economic reform threatened their power. Even if they 
wanted change, they did not want to be "reformed" out of their jobs. 
From the perspective of the parliament, the issue of effectiveness was even 
more complicated. To be taken seriously, the parliament had to make it clear 
that bills were openly debated and all sides heard. To debate delayed desperately 
needed legislation. Ironically, this lack of efficiency lessened the credibility of 
this parliament, named and elected by the old discredited Gierek regime. Ulti-
mately, the imposition of martial law made clear that, whatever the parliament 
had done in Solidarity's fifteen months, institutions in Poland were only as 
strong as the party leaders allowed them to be. Even the minimal opposition that 
was voiced by parliamentary delegates to the state of war had little positive 
resonance: it demonstrated that parliamentary opposition could change nothing. 
From the perspective of those whose careers were within the state bureauc-
racy, it appeared that the population was allowed to act and put pressure on 
them and against them without any external restraints. It did not, however, cause 
them to desert their positions, as their predecessors had, in times of crisis and 
breakdown. Instead, they lived with a split between their public and private 
selves: bureaucrats increasingly involved themselves in Solidarity protests about 
everything but their own work. Their loyalty to the bureaucracy was almost 
solely out of individual economic necessity and their belief that they worked 
well. 60 
In this sense, the imposition of martial law was a kind of "colonel's coup," 
not necessarily to protect the old order-that had largely been broken down-
60 Interview data, 1983; and Julian Pankow and Ewa Maslyk-Musial, Ministerstwa w 
Reform ie Gospodarczej (Wroclaw: Polska Academia Nauk, 1990). 
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but to preserve what bureaucrats and military men saw as the order required for 
the system to continue to function. However unpopular and ineffective the state 
was in delivering the kind of material goods the population expected, martial 
law protected the bureaucracy by slowing down the process of reform and tem-
porarily silencing the critics in Solidarity. Because martial law was not followed 
by effective policy in the direction either of change or of the system's reestab-
lishment, all this resulted, ultimately, in destabilizing the system. 
The Catholic Church 
The options for the Church in this period were complex. On the one hand, 
the Church was able to become a strong political power that negotiated as an 
equal, if not a superior, with government leaders. It served as a political symbol 
and root for the Solidarity movement and was a prime link between the events 
in Poland and the outside. In these roles, the Church was intimately connected 
with the establishment of Solidarity, the balancing of forces in the breakdown 
period, and the establishment of an equilibrium in the system through the visit 
of the Pope and the legitimacy it granted state and party leaders. On the other 
hand, this power was a mixed blessing for the Church. In seeking its support, the 
state and party authorities were forced to grant the Church advantages and 
rights. But, in the trade-off, the Church had to encourage quiescence and dimin-
ish its role as an institutional haven for opposition. 
The Church was also divided internally. Instead of a unified body directed 
by an established Primate whose leadership had spanned the entire postwar pe-
riod, the Church of the 1980s was divided between a young generation of priests 
who were well educated and no longer subservient to the Primate and a new, 
less charismatic and less established Primate attempting to fill expectations es-
tablished by his predecessor. Thus individual churches responded rapidly to the 
events in their parishes and were far more radical than the Catholic hierarchy. 
Such actions strengthened individual churches but strained church-state relations 
at the local level. This weakened the power and credibility of the institution as a 
whole. 
The second visit of Pope John Paul II to Poland was, in this context, the 
pinnacle of religious power in a secular state. Popular expectations were that his 
presence and negotiating skills would force change. Regime hopes, on the other 
hand, were pinned on his using his presence to legitimize tolerance of the re-
gime. For the Catholic hierarchy, it was a chance to enliven the national com-
mitment to the Church. Symbolically, the Pope was victorious: his demand to 
meet with Walesa was conceded to in his final meeting with Jaruzelski . It was 
presented as the result of the Pope summoning Jaruzelski to meet him in the 
national cathedral. More people came to his masses and meetings than had at-
tended in his first visit. But, ultimately, the second visit of the Pope helped sta-
bilize the situation in favor of the government. The clear lesson was that con-
cessions and respect were required. Furthermore, in the weeks and months after 
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the Pope's visit, the Church took a much more restrained stance because state 
leaders did not respond to its demands and because there was little that was or 
could be done concretely to equal the visibility and impact of the Pope's visit. 
This, coupled with the Church hierarchy's own commitment to its long-range 
goal of expanding religious life in Poland, added to the Church's image as an 
increasingly loyal "critic" of the regime.6 1 
Solidarity 
The Solidarity movement began as a Joyal opposition that accepted the 
limits of the Brezhnev Doctrine and fitted its demands to the system. By the end 
of 1981, it had become an opposition force, partly because the most important 
elements of the party and government came to define it as such and partly be-
cause of the dynamics of establishing a trade union movement and forcing rec-
ognition from the system. The Solidarity movement was by design and by ne-
cessity not a unified movement. Its image, however, assumed this national 
"solidarity." Finally, the movement had to balance its actions between the needs 
of the population for the betterment of their living conditions, the realities of 
Poland's economic situation, and the explosion of demands from the bottom. 
The problem of what to demand was a difficult one throughout this period. 
Initially, Solidarity was a trade union seeking recognition and protection of its 
gains from within the system. Ultimately, however, the economic situation made 
the fulfillment of its trade union goals impossible and leaders had to shift to 
achievable political goals. But, when these political gains did not lead to mate-
rial gains, the political system lost its worth for the population. This led to an 
escalation of demands well beyond the very outer limits of the Brezhnev Doc-
trine or the normal concerns of even a highly politicized trade union movement. 
It also made making cooperation with the established political leadership of the 
party and state difficult at best. 
The political options of Solidarity were significantly circumscribed by the 
internal and external imperatives it faced. It was a new organization doing 
things that had never before been perceived as possible in Poland or elsewhere 
in the communist world. Its very organization was a product of the wisdom 
gained after years of upheavals that had brought promises but no real gains: 
workers involved this time did not seek only material gains. They wrote into 
their demands the right to have a legally recognized independent trade union to 
give political protection for economic promises. 
The organizational model that the social movement took on was not 
"solid." In fact, the model was a negation of the centralized internal and external 
control of the Polish United Workers Party. The union moved to the other ex-
treme: rather than creating all-encompassing and hierarchical bureaucracies as 
61 Confidential polls done by CBOS in this period showed that the Pope remained the 
leader for Poles, but the Church did not gain in popularity from his second visit. 
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earlier European movements for suffrage or inclusion into the system had done, 
Solidarity deliberately set up a regionally fragmented structure at its first na-
tional congress. This meant that there was an unending battle, exacerbated by 
the economic crisis and the inability of the union to protect the very material 
gains it had been created to ensure. 
This structure was also a natural outgrowth of the social movement's de-
velopment through a series of spontaneous gatherings with self-appointed · lead-
ers who were given position and visibility by the recognition they received from 
the political and economic establishment. Ironically, although it allowed for and 
even encouraged regional control, it did not give play to the divisions that were 
paramount in Polish society, the divisions between classes and occupational 
groupings. Instead, it attempted to bring all these separate groups together by 
focusing on a jointly held enemy, the political establishment. When economic 
conditions worsened to the point that there was clear competition between 
groups and even individuals for survival, this led to a further fragmentation. It 
also reinforced the tendency, increasingly counterproductive as time went on, to 
focus the organization's pressure on political rather than on unachievable eco-
nomic goals. 
In a system in which all the other negotiating agents were highly central-
ized and institutionalized bureaucracies, this form of organization (useful in the 
context of developing societies) ultimately put Solidarity, and the plethora of 
smaller union and professional associations that grew up with it, at a disadvan-
tage. Those who did negotiate for the union were largely self-selected and 
"approved" by the government and party establishment. By negotiating, they 
were performing a necessary service for the union, but they were also allowing 
themselves to be co-opted by the "enemy" establishment. This dilemma wors-
ened as the economic situation left the negotiators with few gains to report. It 
also worsened as the self-selected leadership found itself in competitive elec-
tions with newly emerging leaders from other regions and from a variety of so-
cial and class groups. This was further complicated by the fact that, under the 
aegis of Solidarity, there were a variety of unions and associations trying to 
match each others' gains: the workers' groups; offshoot organizations represent-
ing specific professional groups or dissident workers; peasants' associations; 
and student associations. Finally, the decentralization and the deliberate attempt 
at equality of power between individuals in the union led to the emergence of 
factions within the Solidarity leadership at all levels (intellectual dissident group 
members whose opposition had begun in the mid- l 970s, young worker activists, 
and seasoned worker opposition from past conflicts). This encouraged these 
groups to focus not on common goals but on personalities and specifics. 
As a movement that flowed into organizations, as opposed to an organized 
movement, Solidarity and the other groups surrounding it were unable to block 
action by organized bureaucracies like the Polish military. At the same time, the 
military rulers were trapped by this "movement style." Because of the informal-
ity and fragmentation of Solidarity's structure, the visible leadership could be 
removed and the means of communication the union had amassed confiscated, 
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but the ideas, the authority, and the movement persisted through "internal mi-
gration" or through the sense that, while one might have to resign oneself, one 
did not need to support any regime. For this reason, under martial law the rulers 
had to continually acknowledge the ideals and power of Solidarity even as they 
destroyed its formal organizational base. In this way, the tactical options of the 
post-Solidarity elite were significantly different from the tactical options of 
the pre-Solidarity elite in Poland or the normalization leaders of Hungary or 
Czechoslovakia. 
From Solidarity to the Exit of Communism 
Polish society and the possibilities for change were significantly different in the 
post-Solidarity period from those that characterized the reequilibration and crisis 
periods of earlier years in Poland. This was the first time that a localized organi-
zation had become nationalized and institutionalized. As a result, it was also the 
first time that an organizational leadership had emerged separate from the tradi-
tional establishment and its intellectual opposition. In addition, this was a period 
in which worker action preceded both comprehensive intellectual platforms and 
internal fragmentation and movement within the party and state bureaucracy and 
elite. Finally, this was the first time that internal decisions were circumscribed 
not only by Soviet tolerance but also by Western involvement, both economic 
and political. This involvement and the economic collapse led to the inability of 
either the new or old elite to provide established and divisible rewards for sup-
port or pacification. 
The result of this complex of new factors, growing out of earlier experi-
ences and policies, was a new form ofreequilibrium or "crisis resolution." There 
was no notion of a "honeymoon period" or of a "pacification or normalization," 
either in the reality of Polish events or in their presentation by actors in them. 
Instead of elites being respected, there was a recognition that there were no ideal 
leaders or institutions. Every institution was lowered in its public prestige and in 
what the public expected of it. The public's perception of the potential for 
change was also reduced by the experience of the Solidarity period and the crisis 
that preceded it. 
The Solidarity movement had a longer period of development and domi-
nance than had any of its predecessors. It was also a more universal movement. 
At the same time, its development and denouement were accompanied by a 
changed elite posture: previously, the promise was for improvements; in the 
1980s, the warning was that things could only get worse, not better, no matter 
what. Finally, given the sense of power that had accompanied Solidarity's gains 
and the stress that had been placed on institution building, the speed with which 
the major structures of the movement were delegalized and debilitated left the 
population with a sense of hopelessness that would take years to break through. 
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Accompanying this was an exacerbation of social and class conflict. This 
underlay the tensions in the Solidarity period and was played upon by the 
martial-law leadership to ensure its power. It further created the necessity of 
public and private posturing, which allowed the population to both oppose and 
survive the system. With the imposition of martial law, this tension further 
fragmented social groups. 
The result was hardly a stable situation. On the other hand, it was a situa-
tion that managed to last until 1989, when the gradual collapse of the rulers' 
power had reached the point that they could do nothing but seek compromise. 
An uneasy interaction between the political controllers and the population de-
veloped, based on what seemed to be an unspoken agreement of the population 
to retreat into its own world and the leadership to accept that retreat. Economic 
failure and the failure of the leadership to accomplish anything were the primary 
tools of pacification. People's faith and hope were simply depressed. All of this 
occurred in a situation where party and state politics lost much of their relevance 
to the population and where even party and state leaders recognized they had to 
co-opt popular ideology rather than insist on Marxist-Leninist images. Ulti-
mately, their only hope was to co-opt their opponents. Poland, after the Solidar-
ity crisis, remained calm, not because of credible leadership or new institutions 
but because the loyal and disloyal opposition had been discredited and an un-
spoken pluralism of political and social worlds had been established. Social dif-
ferences and unresolvable conflict were recognized. So, too, was the impossi-
bility of movement or change. In the end, this meant no one could deny that "the 
emperor had no clothes" by the end of the 1980s. 
